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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT FISCAL 
MANAGEMENT OUTCOMES 
This dissertation aims to reclassify municipal structures of the U.S. municipalities 
and investigates the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal management 
outcomes, including fiscal conditions and fiscal slack balances. This dissertation is 
comprised of four chapters. The first chapter briefly introduces, and each of the remaining 
three is an independent research article. The second chapter investigates seven essential 
structural characteristics of the U.S. municipalities and constructs a municipal structure 
political-administrative index. It then examines the determinants of municipal structures 
on a political-administrative dimension. The empirical results show that municipal 
structure choices are statistically significantly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. Citizens’ income levels play a crucial role in determining 
municipal structure changes during the sample period. 
The third chapter examines the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal 
conditions. Municipal structure is operationalized by the municipal structure political-
administrative index, which is the focus of the second chapter. There are a variety of 
mechanisms through which municipal structures can influence government fiscal 
conditions, among which managerial professionalism, strategy stance, and managerial 
accountability versus efficiency are theoretically addressed. Empirical evidence shows that 
a municipal structure that is more administrative is associated with healthier fiscal 
conditions in cash solvency, dependence on intergovernmental transfers, and debt level. 
Particularly, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the municipal structure 
index and governments’ fiscal conditions. Moreover, municipal structures moderate the 
influence of external environmental factors. 
The fourth chapter investigates the determinants of local government’s fiscal slack 
in a political-budgetary-managerial framework. The research argues that voters’ 
preferences, government’s budgetary performance, and government internal management 
work interactively to influence government fiscal slack, and it proposes appropriate 
indicators for the three explanatory dimensions. Particularly, government internal 
management is operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Empirical results show that voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment have a negative 
effect on the size of government fiscal slack, and government’s budgetary performance 
exerts a positive impact. Moreover, government internal management modifies the effects 
of voters’ preferences and government’ budgetary performance on government fiscal slack. 
KEYWORDS: Municipal Structures, Political-Administrative Index, Government Fiscal 
Management, Fiscal Conditions, Fiscal Slack 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Municipal structures as one of the fundamental institutional settings in the U.S. 
municipalities play an important role in organizing city politics and influencing policy 
formulation and implementation (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004b; Svara and 
Watson 2010). There are five statutory forms of municipal structures in the U.S. 
municipalities: mayor-council, council-manager, commission, town meeting, and 
representative town meeting. Mayor-council and council-manager are the most widely 
adopted statutory municipal structures, and the other three are adopted by a minority group 
of municipalities, mainly in the New England states. Most previous studies, and also this 
dissertation, primarily focuses on the mayor-council and council-manager municipal 
structures. 
Based on the traditional wisdom, the main characteristics of the mayor-council 
structure include: The mayor is elected separately from the council and elected directly by 
the voters, the mayor is responsible for administrative affairs, and the council is responsible 
for legislation (Frederickson and Johnson 2001). The main characteristics of the council-
manager structure include: The council is responsible for both administrative affairs and 
legislation, the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief administrative 
officer to manage administrative affairs, and the mayor is a ceremonial position and is 
usually selected by council members on a rotating basis (Frederickson and Johnson 2001). 
Municipalities’ structures are dynamic and adapt over time (Svara and Watson 
2010). Before the early twentieth century, the strong mayor or classic mayor-council was 
the dominant municipal structure, which was suited to machine politics and resulted in 
widespread corruption of governments (Judd and Swanstrom 2015). The reformed 
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manager or classic council-manager structure was invented in the Progressive Era. Its 
proponents aimed to reduce corruption, withstand machine politics, and provide public 
services efficiently (Judd and Swanstrom 2015; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014). Since 
the 1950s, cross-adoption of structural characteristics between the mayor-council and 
council-manager structures is so common that the boundary between them has become 
ambiguous. The dichotomous separation of the primary municipal structures into the 
mayor-council or council-manager has limitations because it ignores important subsidiary 
features. 
Previous studies have used various methods to reclassify municipal structures, 
among which the “Type III City” framework (the political, the administrative, and the 
adapted) of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) is the most influential. The 
second chapter of this dissertation creates an innovative municipal structure political-
administrative index to reclassify municipal structures by examining seven essential 
structural characteristics that can distinguish municipal structures. Compared to the 
previous efforts, the index has the merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or 
administrative nature of municipal structures by investigating more structural 
characteristics. After introducing the index and discussing its validity and reliability, the 
second chapter investigates the determinants of municipal structures on the political-
administrative dimension. It summarizes the political conflict theory and class cleavage 
theory from the related literature and incorporates these theories into the theoretical model 
of cost analysis. Empirical results demonstrate that the municipal structure political-
administrative index is tightly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, most of which are consistent with the theoretical predictions and previous 
3 
studies. Regarding the changes in municipal structures during the sample period, the 
research finds that municipalities that have higher per capita incomes are more likely to 
adapt toward the administrative structure. 
The third chapter aims to relate municipal structures, which is operationalized by 
the municipal structure political-administrative index, to government fiscal conditions. 
Municipal structures are correlated with government internal management through a 
variety of mechanisms. The administrative municipal structure promotes managerial 
professionalism and efficiency and stimulates officials to act as prospectors in the choice 
of managerial strategy stance. These effects lead to a positive correlation between the 
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal performance. On 
the other hand, considering the public nature of governments, officials’ accountability to 
the public and prompt reacting to the dynamic demands of voters are also important for 
improving government performance. This study accordingly hypothesizes that the 
municipal structure that mixes the political and administrative characteristics may result in 
better fiscal conditions, which implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
municipal structure index and indicators of government fiscal conditions. In addition, 
municipal structure can moderate effects of the factors of external environment on 
government fiscal performance. The empirical evidence supports the proposed hypotheses 
for the fiscal conditions of governments in cash solvency, dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers, and debt level. The evidence becomes stronger when using 
instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem of municipal structures. 
The last chapter examines the effect of municipal structures on government fiscal 
slack in a three-dimensional framework composed of voters’ preferences, government’s 
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budgetary performance, and government internal management. Particularly, government 
internal management is operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative 
index. Saving fiscal slack in economic booms to prepare for fiscal crises in the future is a 
prevailing strategy adopted by the U.S. state and local governments. Fiscal slack of local 
government is a more salient issue compared to the state due to the large size and informal 
forms. The study uses Massachusetts municipalities as a research sample. The empirical 
findings show that the defined budgetary gap is positively and statistically significantly 
related to government’s fiscal slack balances, which is measured by either the level of 
stabilization funds or the sum of stabilization funds and other informal forms of fiscal slack 
resources. However, the municipal structure political-administrative index weakens the 
positive effect of the budgetary gap. The pro-spending sentiment of voters has a negative 
effect on government fiscal slack, and the municipal structure index weakens the negative 
effect. 
5 
CHAPTER 2. THE DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL STRUCTURES ON A POLITICAL-
ADMINISTRATIVE DIMENSION 
2.1 Introduction 
Municipal structures play an important role in organizing city politics and 
influencing policy formulation and implementation (Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 
2004b; Svara & Watson, 2010). Formal municipal structures provide the framework within 
which the policy maker “sets the rules of participation, exercises authority by making and 
carrying out the law (statutes, ordinances, or regulations), selects persons to politically 
represent all residents or some subset of residents, operates a permanent bureaucracy, 
provides services, and determines who will pay what in taxes.” (Frederickson, Johnson, & 
Wood, 2004b). Also, municipal structures can “supply particular channels for information 
to travel through and among organizations.” (Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001). 
Like most scholars in this field, in this study, we focus on U.S. municipalities with 
the statutory form of mayor-council or council-manager.1 Municipalities’ structures are 
dynamic and adapt over time (Svara & Watson, 2010). Before the early twentieth century, 
the strong mayor or classic mayor-council was the dominant municipal structure, which 
was suited to machine politics and resulted in widespread corruption of governments (Judd 
& Swanstrom, 2015). The reformed manager or classic council-manager structure was 
invented in the Progressive Era. Its proponents aimed to reduce corruption, withstand 
machine politics, and provide public services efficiently (Judd & Swanstrom, 2015; 
1 The other three statutory municipal forms include the commission, the town meeting, and the representative 
town meeting. These forms are adopted by a minority group of municipalities, mainly in the New England 
states. According to the data from the Municipal Form of Government surveys by the International 
City/County Management Association, 9.7%, 9.7%, 8.0%, 6.7%, 7.6%, 6.7%, and 8.0% of the responding 
municipalities adopt these three forms in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011. 
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Wheeland, Palus, & Wood, 2014). The classic council-manager structure, first adopted in 
1908 in Staunton, Virginia, was the most influential reformed municipal structure in the 
first half of the twentieth century (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Svara & Watson, 2010; 
Wheeland, Palus, & Wood, 2014). 
Conventional wisdom holds that, since the 1950s, the balance between various types 
of municipal structures has been stabilized (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013). There have been, 
however, two emerging trends in municipal structure changes in recent decades. First, 
cross-adoption of structural characteristics between the mayor-council and council-
manager structures is so common that the boundary between them has become ambiguous. 
The dichotomous separation of municipal structures into the mayor-council or council-
manager has limitations because it ignores important subsidiary features. Scholars have 
proposed the so-called “Type III City” framework to reclassify municipal structures 
(Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; 
Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001). Second, based on data from the Municipal Form of 
Government surveys by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), 
between 1981 and 2011, the proportion of mayor-council municipalities was still declining 
and the proportion of council-manager municipalities was increasing. Figure 1.1 displays 
the trends.2 
2 Figure 1.1 displays the percentages of only the mayor-council and council-manager municipalities, ignoring 
municipalities with the other three statutory forms. Therefore, the sum of percentages in each year is less 
than 100%. 
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Figure 1.1 Percentages of Mayor-Council and Council-Manager Municipalities by Year 
We aim to examine what factors determine municipal structure choices in this 
study. Some previous studies have involved this topic, but most previous studies use cross-
sectional data and a small sample of municipalities, usually the municipalities that have a 
large population size (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Gordon, 1968; Kessel, 1962; Knoke, 
1982; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). We continue this thread of research and aim to 
contribute to the scholarship both theoretically and empirically with panel data for a large 
number of municipalities. 
This research is organized as follows: Section two briefly introduces the related 
literature; section three measures municipal structures on a political-administrative 
dimension and discusses the reliability and validity of the municipal structure index; 
section four builds a theoretical model to explain municipal structure choices; section five 
proposes some hypotheses; section six introduces the methodology, and section seven 
presents the empirical findings. This research ends with brief conclusions in the last 
section. 
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2.2 Related Literature 
This section examines both the theoretical argument and empirical evidence on 
municipal structures. Scholars have developed theories from political and social science 
to explain municipal structure adoptions and changes. Political conflict theory and class 
cleavage theory dominate these theories. The research considered here is based on the idea 
that citizens can form and express preferences about municipal structure choices and that 
municipal structure reflects those preferences. 
Kessel (1962) develops the political conflict theory and discusses municipal 
government structure choices from the perspective of a conflicting political environment. 
Kessel (1962) holds that the political mayor-council structure is adopted in municipalities 
where defined social norms and benefits must be adhered to, where conflicting benefits 
exist and have to be arbitrated, and where disadvantaged groups need political channels 
for expression. 
The social cleavage theory, which is utilized by many scholars in this field, holds 
that groups from various backgrounds in terms of religion, wealth, profession, race, 
ethnicity, and educational attainment, have different preferences in methods of political 
participation and in pursuit of interests. Hirschman (1982) argues that municipal structures 
are highly dynamic and change based on the shifting values between pursuits of the private 
interests of individuals and the public interests of the society as an entity. Such scholars as 
Banfield and Wilson (1963), Lineberry and Fowler (1967), Hays (1974), Knoke (1982), 
Simmons and Simmons (2004), and Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013) believe that the shift of 
municipal structures from the unreformed strong mayor to the reformed council-manager 
is the result of contests between two groups: (1) the moralistic middle- and upper-class 
9 
predominantly white native Protestants and business and professional elite, who have 
higher educational degrees, hold “public regarding ethos,” and seek a structure responsive 
to their interests and (2) the working class, minorities, the poor, and immigrants, who want 
a government responsive to their needs. 
Different from the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory, Knoke (1982) 
describes the adoption of the reformed council-manager municipal structure as an 
innovation diffusion process. Simmons and Simmons (2004) explain municipal structure 
choices from five perspectives, including government design flaws, political conflicts, 
sociodemographic cleavage, government legitimacy problems, and leadership deficits.3 
The evidence from empirical exploration is mixed. Kessel (1962) finds that the 
reformed council-manager structure is associated with a medium-size population, a high 
growth rate, a small percentage of foreign-born population, and an economic base with a 
large fraction in professional service and a small fraction in manufacturing. Wolfinger and 
Field (1966) and Farnham and Bryant (1985) discover that the region and age of cities are 
essential in determining governmental structures. Findings of Lineberry and Fowler (1967) 
demonstrate that reformed cities are more homogenous in terms of race, ethnicity, and 
religion, which is consistent with the social cleavage theory. Gordon (1968) demonstrates 
that the fraction of immigrants is associated with a higher probability of adopting 
unreformed political municipal structures. Dye and MacManus (1976) use discriminant 
function analysis to explore the determinants of municipal government structures, and they 
find that the ethnicity composition predicts the type of constituency (ward or at-large) well, 
3 Many of their perspectives are close to the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory. Refer to 
Simmons and Simmons (2004) for details. 
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but the region of municipalities is a better predictor of election method (partisan or 
nonpartisan). 
Some recent studies also provide evidence. Simmons and Simmons (2004) use 
ordinal values to measure municipal structure changes on a political-administrative 
dimension. Utilizing the ordered logit model, they find that municipal structures are 
affected by the race, ethnicity, and educational attainment of citizens. Choi, Feiock, and 
Bae (2013) employ a historical dataset that spans 75 years and contains the 191 largest 
cities in 1930 to explore the determinants of adoption and abandonment of the council-
manager structure. Their results show that the economic conditions of municipalities are 
the most essential determinants. 
Previous studies of municipal structure adoption have several limitations. In 
considering the structural choices, almost all previous studies focus on the shift between 
the mayor-council and council-manager structures. However, in recent decades, 
municipalities on each of these statutory platforms are absorbing characteristics of the 
other. A pure city structure, either mayor-council or council-manager, is inadequate to 
reflect the complex features of municipal structures in reality. So far, there is a lack of 
evidence on determinants of municipal structures among multiple possible choices. 
Second, most previous studies focus on a limited number of municipalities, usually the 
ones with a large population. Therefore, lessons have limited external generalizability. 
Last, much prior research uses the method of comparison of sample means of 
municipalities’ characteristics in different structures, and most previous studies use one-
year cross-sectional data. Although some recent studies utilize a panel dataset that spans a 
11 
longer time period and adopt more advanced econometric models (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 
2013; Simmons & Simmons, 2004), evidence is insufficient. 
2.3 Measuring Municipal Structures on a Political-Administrative Dimension 
2.3.1 Merits of the Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index 
The motivation of reclassifying and measuring municipal structures on a political-
administrative dimension is rooted in the limitation of the binary separation of the main 
municipal structures into the mayor-council and council-manager forms. As argued in 
many previous studies, the prevalent cross-adoption of characteristics between these two 
structures makes a dichotomous classification problematic (Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, 
2009, 2010; Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Nelson & Svara, 2010). We 
provide statistical evidence to support this argument, using the data from the Municipal 
Form of Government survey in 2011 by the ICMA. 
Based on the traditional wisdom, the main characteristics of the mayor-council 
structure include: The mayor is elected separately from the council and elected directly by 
the voters, the mayor is responsible for administrative affairs, and the council is 
responsible for legislation (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001). The main characteristics of 
the council-manager structure include: The council is responsible for both administrative 
affairs and legislation, the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief 
administrative officer to manage administrative affairs, and the mayor is a ceremonial 
position and is usually selected by council members on a rotating basis (Frederickson & 
Johnson, 2001). 
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Among the 3,566 municipalities responding to ICMA’s survey in 2011, 1,182 
(33%) used the mayor-council structure, and 2,098 (59%) used the council-manager 
structure. Other structures account for 8%. Among the mayor-council municipalities, 
1,093 had a mayor elected directly by voters, but 50 had a mayor that was selected by 
council members from themselves or council members rotated into the position. In 620 of 
the 1,182 mayor-council municipalities, the mayor was independent from the council; 
however, the mayor served in the council in 514 municipalities. Moreover, in 717 of the 
1,182 mayor-council municipalities, there was a chief administrative officer who was 
responsible for or helped the mayor manage administrative affairs. The statistical analysis 
shows that the mayor-council municipalities used many of the structural characteristics of 
the council-manager structure. Similar cross-adoption of structural characteristics existed 
in the council-manager municipalities. For instance, among the 2,098 municipalities that 
reported a council-manager structure, 1,039 had a mayor who was directly elected by 
voters. This is a sharp contrast to the traditional wisdom. Data from ICMA’s surveys for 
other years (2001, 2006) show similar findings. 
Both existing evidence from previous studies and our statistical analysis of survey 
data reveal that separating the main municipal structures into the mayor-council and 
council-manager forms is problematic. In this study, we investigate seven essential 
structural characteristics (presented in table 1.1) of municipalities. These structural 
characteristics are well discussed by Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009), Frederickson, 
Johnson, & Wood (2004a, 2004b), and Frederickson and Johnson (2001), who attempt to 
use the characteristics to reclassify municipal structures. We assign each characteristic a 
numerical value of 0, 0.5, or 1 based on its political or administrative nature. We conduct 
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factor analysis of the seven values of structural characteristics to construct a municipal 
structure political-administrative index. A lower index indicates a more political municipal 
structure, underscoring checks and balances between the mayor and council members, 
representation of interests of particular groups and specific districts, direct responsiveness 
and accountability of the mayor to voters, and influence of parties in local politics. On the 
contrary, the more administrative municipal structure, indicated by a higher index, stresses 
professional management of municipality affairs, membership of the mayor in the council, 
concentration of authority in council, and elimination of partisan influence on elections. 
Table 1.1 Standards of Constructing Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index 
Standards\Coded values 0 0.5 1 
Statutory form Mayor-council Council-manager 
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer No Yes 
Mayor election method Direct election Non-direct election 
Mayor is independent of council Yes No 
Authority of mayor to veto council Yes No 
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members Partisan Nonpartisan 
At-large or by-district election of council members By-district Combination At-large 
Previous studies have proposed various approaches to reclassify municipal 
structures, most of which attempt to reclassify municipal structures into several types. 
Among them, the approach of Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) is closest to ours 
in this study. Modifying the “Type III City” framework (the political, the administrative, 
and the adapted) of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b), Carr and 
Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) classify the mayor-council and council-manager 
structures into six subtypes, including the political, adapted political, conciliated political, 
conciliated administrative, adapted administrative, and administrative. Carr and 
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Karuppusamy (2008, 2009) argue that these subtypes of municipal structures range from 
the most political to the most administrative. 
A limitation in the approach of Carr and Karuppusamy is that they investigate many 
more structural characteristics than that they use to make reclassification, and the 
boundaries between their subtypes of municipal structures are sometimes ambiguous. This 
limitation is somewhat expected because as more structural characteristics are involved to 
reclassify in practice, more subtypes must be defined. Otherwise, many municipalities 
cannot be categorized into any specific type. Therefore, our approach of constructing an 
index to reclassify municipal structures on a political-administrative dimension has the 
merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or administrative nature of municipal 
structures by investigating more structural characteristics. We discuss the reliability and 
validity of the index below. 
2.3.2 Index Reliability 
The common method to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate its 
“dependability, stability, consistency, reproducibility and lack of distortion.” (Kerlinger & 
Lee, 2000). The seven components of our index are objective features for assessing the 
political or administrative nature of municipal structures. Municipality samples in ICMA’s 
surveys are selected based on their population size. In each survey year, ICMA mails 
survey questions to all municipalities with population size above 2,500 and to selected ones 
among the small-sized municipalities. To mitigate selection bias, our study includes only 
the municipalities with population size above 2,500. The response rates of ICMA’s surveys 
in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are all around 50%, which is fairly high for a national survey of 
local governments. Our data to construct the index are accessible from ICMA, although 
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they are not free. Therefore, the results are reproducible. The form of ICMA’s survey 
questions are uniform across time, with few changes. This improves the uniformity and 
consistency of the data sources. Moreover, ICMA’s surveys have been conducted every 
five years since 1981. Across-time data makes the index more dependable (Clark, 2015). 
A useful technique to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate the correlation of 
the index components. Table 1.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for each pair 
of the index components in our samples and the statistical significance level. The 
components are positively correlated with each other at the 0.01 level, providing evidence 
of reliability. 
Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix of Index Components 
a b c d e f g 
a 1 
b 0.5382*** 1 
c 0.3211*** 0.1871*** 1 
d 0.4685*** 0.3272*** 0.3159*** 1 
e 0.4781*** 0.3312*** 0.2901*** 0.5935*** 1 
f 0.2654*** 0.2212*** 0.0738*** 0.2069*** 0.1950*** 1 
g 0.2338*** 0.1697*** 0.1706*** 0.2843*** 0.3228*** 0.0988*** 1 
Another technique to evaluate reliability of an index is to calculate the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha. Values of Cronbach’s alpha range between 0 and 1, with a higher value 
indicating closer correlation between components of the index (Clark, 2015). The value of 
Cronbach’s alpha is 0.75 in our case, indicating that reliability of our index is acceptable 
(Berman & Wang, 2017). 
2.3.3 Index Validity 
“With validity, the goal is to figure out if we are measuring the concept that we 
intended to measure.” (Clark, 2015). Adopting the method of Clark (2015), we assess 
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validity of our index in three aspects: Content validity, criterion-related validity, and 
construct validity, using theoretical arguments, existing evidence, and statistical 
techniques. 
Content validity requires that components of the index should include all possible 
items that can measure the core concept (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000), and there should be 
evidence from the literature demonstrating the validity of these items in measuring the 
concept. The requirement of “all possible items” is extremely strict and can be satisfied 
only theoretically. In practice, there may be dozens of potential components (structural 
characteristics of municipalities). However, we need to balance thoroughness with 
parsimony and to consider data availability. The seven components we include in our 
standards in classifying municipal structures are well discussed in the literature by studies 
such as Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009), Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood (2004a, 
2004b), and Frederickson and Johnson (2001). Therefore, it is safe to use them to construct 
our municipal structure index. Particularly, we use more structural characteristics relating 
to institutional settings than to management practice. 
Criterion-related validity requires the constructed index to be correlated with other 
potential measures of the same concept. In our case, the statutory municipal forms, mayor-
council or council-manager, are traditionally used as a binary measurement of municipal 
structures. The former is the political structure and the latter is the administrative structure. 
The positive correlations between the statutory municipal form with other six components, 
which are presented in the first column in table 1.2, demonstrates that the components of 
our index are valid. 
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Construct validity is the most important and complex form of measurement validity 
(Clark, 2015; Kerlinger & Lee, 2000; Morgan et al., 2001). Assessment of construct 
validity is usually conducted by theoretically connecting the components of the index to 
the concept that we intend to measure. Also, construct validity asks “which factors account 
for the variance in performance of the thing we are trying to measure?” (Clark, 2015). We 
first provide a theoretical analysis and then use factor analysis to assess the construct 
validity of our index. 
As noted previously, the statutory municipal form, mayor-council or council-
manager, is the traditional separation of municipal structures into the political or 
administrative ones. Although this separation is problematic because of the cross-adoption 
of structural characteristics between themselves, it has intuitive validity to be used as one 
component of our municipal structure political-administrative index. 
The existence of a chief administrative officer (CAO) is an administrative 
municipal structure characteristic. CAOs are usually trained experts who hold professional 
degrees and have extensive experience in public management and administration (Demir 
& Reddick, 2012; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; Nalbandian, 1999). They usually have 
considerable discretion in municipal governments’ policy formulation and implementation 
(Zhang, 2014; Zhang & Feiock, 2009; Demir & Reddick, 2012; Selden, Brewer, & 
Brudney, 1999). Placing local government management under a CAO has the potential to 
increase government management efficiency (Deno & Mehay, 1987; Stumm & Corrigan, 
1998). 
Political municipal structures are characterized by a mayor who is directly elected 
by voters and works independently of the council (Frederickson, Logan, & Wood, 2003; 
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Frederickson, Johnson, & Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Carr & Karuppusamy, 2008, 2009). 
Checks and balances between the mayor and council members constrain their discretion 
and mitigate deviations in their behavior from citizens’ preferences (Persson, Roland, & 
Tabellini, 1997; Persson & Tabellini, 1999), and citizens will have alternative channels to 
express their preferences. Besides, as argued by Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), 
“under appropriate checks and balances, separation of power also helps the voters elicit 
information.”4 
Political municipal structures are also characterized by the authority of the mayor 
to veto council-passed decisions. Public policies can be approved only when both of the 
players agree to them (Coate & Knight, 2011). The mayor’s power of vetoing increases 
the potential of checks and balances between the mayor and council and provides citizens 
more channels to defend their benefits. This characteristic reduces the cost of citizens for 
monitoring elected public officials but may increase the political struggles in localities and 
lead to inefficient government policy making or implementation (Judd & Swanstrom, 
2015; Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015). 
Partisan and district elections of council members are political municipal structure 
characteristics. Partisan elections and council members who are elected by district usually 
focus more on the benefits of particular groups or precincts. The political motivation of 
catering to a specific group or constituency that can contribute more political support 
encourages elected officials to invest a substantial amount of resources in public programs 
4 Although the argument of Persson and Tabellini (1997) is implied in the context of comparison between 
the presidential or parliamentary systems, it is reasonable to apply the argument in the comparison between 
diverse structures in municipalities. 
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that might not produce the maximum level of marginal benefits and, hence, creates 
government inefficiencies. 
We finally use factor analysis to assess whether the seven components of our 
municipal structure index are appropriately loaded. The factor analysis reports only one 
factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, demonstrating that the components of our index 
measure a core concept, which we interpret as the political or administrative nature of 
municipal structures. Factor loadings of the principal factor are presented in table 1.3. The 
principal factor has positive loadings for all the seven components, among which the 
statutory form, existence of CAO, whether mayor is independent of council, and authority 
of mayor to veto council, are more highly loaded. 
Table 1.3 Factor Analysis of Seven Components of the Index 
Index Components Factor 1 Uniqueness 
Statutory form 0.7173 0.4483 
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer 0.5560 0.6146 
Mayor selection method 0.4107 0.8140 
Mayor is independent of council 0.6923 0.4918 
Authority of mayor to veto council 0.6991 0.4785 
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members 0.3127 0.8742 
At-large or by-district election of council members 0.3783 0.8337 
2.4 A Theoretical Model to Explain Municipal Structure Choices 
This section incorporates arguments of political conflict theory and class cleavage 
theory into our theoretical model of the cost analysis of citizens. The fundamental idea of 
political conflict theory and class cleavage theory is that the municipal structure choices 
are results of contests between groups with different socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, who have various interest pursuits and preferences for public policies. We 
further argue that the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of citizens in 
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municipalities can influence the costs of monitoring government officials and the 
inefficiency costs of policy making or implementation. The aim of minimizing the total 
costs determines citizens’ municipal structure choices. The main purpose of this section is 
to provide an alternative explanation of municipal structure choices. 
The theoretical model is based on the fundamental assumption that citizens in local 
communities in a representative democracy tend to choose the government structure that 
can best delegate governmental management to professionally trained experts for 
efficiency gains, while holding public officials accountable.5 6 7 In this present study, we 
define accountability as the extent to which citizens in municipalities can make public 
officials, both elected politicians and appointed bureaucrats, be representative of their 
particular interests and can have channels to express their preferences in public policy 
5  This assumption is based on the premise that local citizens have the autonomy to customize their 
government structures in accordance with local characteristics. This is consistent with the argument of 
Frederickson at al. (2004a, 2004b) but is criticized by Nelson (2011). The latter argues and empirically finds 
that constraints on local government structural choices by states restrict municipalities’ autonomy in 
determining their own governmental structures. After an extensive examination of state statutory and 
constitutional provisions on structures of local governments with population more than 10,000, Nelson 
(2011) finds that 28 states grant the majority of their municipal governments the autonomy to choose their 
form at will whereas other states do not. The constraints on municipal structures and modifications are usually 
tied to the population size, based on which home rule is designated. To make the argument of this present 
research more reliable, the scope of municipalities may be limited to the ones that obtain home rule, or at 
least to the ones above a certain population size threshold. 
6 “Accountability is an important yet elusive concept whose meaning and characteristics differ depending 
upon the context” (Posner, 1995). In political science, accountability usually means the agent must be 
answerable to the higher authority who delegates authority to act (Behn, 2001; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). 
Political accountability concerns the degree to which the electorate can control politicians (Lassen, 2000), 
usually through regular elections and institutional designs such as initiative and petition. 
7 Two components in terms of efficiency exist when this concept is utilized in public management and 
economics research: technical efficiency and distributive efficiency. Technical efficiency focuses on the 
relationship between inputs and outputs (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015). “The higher the output of some 
productive process relative to the input the more technically efficient that process is.” (Mossberger, Clarke, 
& John, 2015). Distributive efficiency concerns the relationship between demand and supply and it is 
considered to be more distributive efficient when “more people receive the type and level of service they 
want.” (Mossberger, Clarke, & John, 2015). 
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making. Like many scholars, we define efficiency as the capacity of governments to 
enhance public resource utilization. 
The proposed assumption is reflected in a wide array of prior studies in political 
science. Shepsle (1988) argues that when evaluating a representative government, it is 
necessary to consider not only its responsiveness to the constituents but also its efficiency 
in dealing with public business. Adsera, Boix, and Payne’s (2003) standards of a well-
functioning government include efficiency and incorruptness (accountability). Putnam et 
al. (1994) point out that a good democratic government is the one that can provide citizens 
“the right to petition their government in the hope of achieving some individual or social 
goal” (accountability) and actually “gets things done” (efficiency). 
The second important assumption is that the elected officials place high priority on 
meeting the demands of their constituency; however, professional managers focus on 
management efficiency and effectiveness. The main goal of elected public officials is to 
get reelected through satisfying demands of voters, and they seek to use political power to 
pursue public policy and personal goals (Persson, Roland, & Tabellini, 1997). The expert 
managers, who are appointed by elected officials, have to consider not only the demands 
of voters that are channeled through orders of the elected officials but also the pressure of 
building an outstanding reputation among peers in such professional organizations as 
ICMA and the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (Dunn & Legge, 2001). 
The reputation incentive of managers may compel them to deviate from mandates of 
elected officials when their professional judgement is at odds with orders from the latter. 
Delegating government management to professionally trained managers has the 
potential to improve management efficiency but enhances the difficulty of holding the 
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managers accountable (Carr, 2015; Deno & Mehay, 1987; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). 
Therefore, the monitoring cost of citizens increases. On the other hand, government 
management under directly elected politicians, who focus more on political responsiveness 
and gaining reelection, can assure accountability but raise inefficiency cost due to the lack 
of managerial expertise. The two simultaneous goals of citizens create a dilemma: They 
have to make a trade-off between the interdependent monitoring cost and inefficiency cost. 
We construct an index to indicate the political or administrative nature of municipal 
structure and array municipal structures on the political-administrative dimension (refer to 
discussions in section three). Figure 1.2 illustrates our fundamental theoretical arguments. 
The abscissa indicates the political-administrative dimension of municipal structures. The 
most political structure is placed at the left end, and the most administrative structure is 
placed at the right end. Citizens’ expected monitoring cost increases when municipal 
structures move from the political to the administrative; meanwhile, their expected 
inefficiency cost declines. 
The core of our theoretical model is the trade-off between the expected inefficiency 
cost and monitoring cost with movement along the political-administrative dimension. The 
optimal structure should be the one that minimizes the total expected costs of inefficiency 
and monitoring. As exhibited in figure 1.2, the total expected cost (𝐶𝑠) is calculated by 
vertically summing the corresponding expected inefficiency cost ( 𝐶1 ) and expected 
monitoring cost (𝐶2) at a certain structure 𝑆. The optimal structure is denoted as 𝑆
∗, with
corresponding total cost at the minimum level 𝐶∗. 
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Figure 1.2 Theoretical Model of Optimal Municipal Structure 
Notes: The cost curves assume positive first derivative (marginal 
cost) and second derivative (increasing cost) in the appropriate direction. 
The optimal point is found where the absolute values of the first derivatives 
(marginal costs) are equal. That does not imply the levels of the costs are 
equal, but that is a possibility that is graphed. The optimal point could be 
on either side. 
The exact place of  𝑆∗ depends on the shapes of the two cost curves. We assume a 
concave curve (positive second derivative) for both types of cost, meaning each cost 
increases at an increasing rate in the appropriate direction. The sum must have a positive 
second derivative, also being concave.  As long as costs are low on one end for each, the 
optimal structure is a point between the left and right ends. We place the optimal 
structure 𝑆∗ at the point where the corresponding expected monitoring and inefficiency cost 
curves intersect for simplification.  In general, the optimum is at the point where both 
curves have the same absolute value of the first derivative. 
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The optimal structure 𝑆∗ changes over time and varies across municipalities. The 
actual place of  𝑆∗ is presumably determined by citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, which can influence the monitoring and inefficiency cost curves and 
derivatives. If either cost exhibits very slow marginal change, then controlling the other 
cost dominates the decision. If monitoring is easy, reducing inefficiency with an 
administrative structure is an optimal choice. If the opposite, reducing monitoring cost 
through increasing the political nature of municipal structures is preferred. 
2.5 Hypotheses 
Based on previous studies and the theoretical model, we discuss and propose 
hypotheses with regard to the effects of some socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of citizens or municipalities on municipal structure choices in this section. 
Those characteristics include income level and inequality, educational attainment, race 
composition, economic conditions, and industry structures. Political conflict and class 
cleavage theory imply that these characteristics are associated with preferences over 
municipal structure choices. In addition, municipality size and the existence of citizens’ 
initiative are in the model. Municipality size relates to efficiency of government 
management and cost of monitoring officials, and initiative allows preferences however 
formed to be expressed. 
High income groups have advantages in accessing necessary information on public 
policy making and government operation because information collection is costly (Downs, 
1957). Therefore, monitoring the elected public officials is presumably easier for citizens 
with higher income. From another perspective, economic performance and wealth of the 
community contribute to accumulation of social capital (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Putnam 
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et al., 1994); meanwhile, social capital usually leads to “low social polarization, and formal 
institutional rules that constrain the government from acting arbitrarily.” (Knack & Keefer, 
1997). Therefore, wealthy municipalities are usually imbedded with formal institutions 
that can effectively constrain public officials’ rent seeking behavior. In municipalities with 
higher per capita income, citizens may feel it is easier to make public officials accountable 
and more necessary to realize government efficiency. Hence, reducing inefficiency with a 
more administrative municipal structure is an optimal choice. 
Hypothesis 1: The per capita income is positively correlated with the 
municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Educational attainment contributes to citizens’ active political participation and 
increases their exposure to cosmopolitan culture. It helps build civic engagement and 
interpersonal trust, which are crucial components of social capital (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; 
Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999). “Greater levels of civic engagement and interpersonal 
cooperation should lead to closer monitoring and to more abundant information about the 
public arena.” (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003). Therefore, gathering information on 
government operation and monitoring public officials are relatively easier for groups with 
higher educational attainment. In addition, higher educational attainment is generally 
correlated with professional and managerial occupations. The fraction of citizens with 
educational attainment at high school or above among the citizens who are 25 years old 
and over is an indicator of the overall educational attainment of municipalities. In 
municipalities with higher educational attainment, citizens may feel it is easier to make 
public officials accountable and more important to realize government efficiency. Thus, 
reducing inefficiency with a more administrative municipal structure is an optimal choice. 
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Hypothesis 2: The educational attainment of citizens is positively 
correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
The effect of income inequality can be examined through its relationship with 
political engagement in municipalities (Goodin & Dryzek, 1980; Solt, 2004, 2008). Solt 
(2008) argues that income inequality may increase citizens’ political engagement because 
“higher levels of inequality cause divergences in political preferences that fuel debates 
about the appropriate course of policy; these debates then cause higher rates of political 
mobilization.” Therefore, in municipalities with a higher level of income inequality, 
citizens will more actively participate in political activities and require channels to express 
their demands. Hence, the political municipal structures can satisfy the preferences of 
citizens. In municipalities with higher levels of income inequality, citizens may feel it is 
more important and difficult to make public officials accountable to defend their own 
benefits. Also, elected officials are in a better position to mediate interest conflicts in the 
community. This research uses the ratio of mean income to median income of citizens as 
measurement of the income inequality. 
Hypothesis 3: The income inequality is negatively correlated with 
the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Previous studies have demonstrated the important role of racial and ethnic 
fractionalization in local politics. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find that racial 
fractionalization is associated with patronage spending. “The more fractionalized a society 
is, the more difficult it is to govern.” (Keefer, 2007). Besides, racial and ethnic 
fractionalization may engender political instability (Horowitz, 1985). Racial and ethnic 
fractionalization can provoke fierce conflicts between diverse groups when each group 
27 
actively participates in local politics to advocate its own benefits. All the characteristics 
described can sufficiently increase the tendency of citizens in municipalities to choose a 
government structure that prompts political accountability for protecting their benefits. We 
utilize the proportion of blacks and the proportion of foreign-born citizens among the 
whole population as indicators of racial and ethnic fractionalization in municipalities. In 
ethnically and racially fractionalized municipalities, citizens may feel it is more important 
to make public officials accountable and to have more channels to protect their own 
benefits. Therefore, reducing monitoring cost with a more political municipal structure is 
an optimal choice. 
Hypothesis 4: The proportions of blacks and foreign-born citizens 
among the whole population are negatively correlated with the municipal 
structure political-administrative index. 
The small- and medium-sized communities presumably have lower levels of social 
cleavages (Choi, Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967). To the contrary, a 
larger population size has more potential to result in higher levels of diversity and social 
cleavages, as well as active political mobilization and engagement. Citizens will have more 
incentives to make public officials adhere to their particular benefits. 
From another perspective, a large population is generally associated with a larger 
bureaucratic system, increasing the cost for citizens to monitor government officials 
efficiently. Citizens in municipalities with a large population may feel it is more important 
to constrain the behavior of officials because government has charge of more public 
resources. In municipalities with a larger population, citizens may feel it is more important 
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and difficult to make public officials accountable. Thus, reducing monitoring cost with a 
more political municipal structure is an optimal choice. 
Hypothesis 5: The population size of municipalities is negatively 
correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Local economic conditions and industry structures can also affect citizens’ 
municipal structure choices. Choi, Feiock, and Bae (2013) argue that “demand for changes 
in forms of local government may occur in response to economic or environmental 
concerns of crises that compel local politicians and citizens to question the legitimacy of 
existing institutional arrangements.” In municipalities that are mired in economic 
hardships, citizens’ passion for governmental structure reform may be provoked. Citizens 
in municipalities that face severe economic conditions may feel it is important to have 
professional management to improve governmental efficiency. We use the unemployment 
rate as an indicator of economic conditions. In municipalities with a higher unemployment 
rate, citizens may feel it is more important to improve economic efficiency and 
performance. Therefore, reducing inefficiency cost with a more administrative municipal 
structure is an optimal choice. 
In municipalities that are more dependent on manufacturing industry, the labor 
force is comprised of a larger fraction of lower-income and blue-collar groups. In contrast, 
in municipalities that rely more on the professional, managerial, scientific, and 
administrative industries (PMSA), the labor force is constituted more by the middle- and 
upper-class groups. We use the fraction of labor force in the two categories of industries 
as indicators of local economic structures. 
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Hypothesis 6a: The unemployment rate is positively correlated with 
the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Hypothesis 6b: The fraction of the labor force in manufacturing is 
negatively correlated with the municipal structure political-administrative 
index. 
Hypothesis 6c: The fraction of labor force in the professional, 
managerial, scientific, and administrative industries is positively correlated 
with the political-administrative index. 
Considering the autonomy of local citizens in choosing their municipal government 
structures, we look into the effect of citizens’ authority of initiative, which allows citizens 
to place charter, ordinance, or home rule changes on the ballot by collecting a required 
number of signatures on petitions. Initiatives can work toward either end of the scale 
depending on the local socioeconomic and demographic situations. 
Hypotheses 7: The authority of citizens to introduce initiatives is 
correlated either positively or negatively with the municipal structure 
political-administrative index. 
2.6 Methodology 
2.6.1 Model Specification 
Municipal structure is measured up to three times for each municipality. The 
estimation includes pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, random effects, and 
fixed effects. Explanatory variables implied by the theory to relate to municipal structure 
should also be related through the changes of explanatory variables and municipal structure, 
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which are the focus of the random effects and fixed effects models. Both levels and changes 
of municipal structure are relevant measures to test the theory. 
The municipal structure political-administrative index is modeled as a function of 
a series of socioeconomic and demographic factors and one institutional factor that are 
discussed in the hypotheses section. The relationship can be specified as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln [𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1)] + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡) 
+𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀(𝑖,𝑡)      (1). 
The dependent variable is the municipal structure political-administrative index. 𝑋 
indicates a vector of socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of citizens or 
municipalities. We take the natural log of the values of these factors. 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 is a binary 
variable that indicates the existence of the initiative. The estimated effects and the intercept 
are 𝛽. The year fixed effects 𝜃𝑡 control for national level forces that are constant for all 
states in the year, and 𝜀 denotes the error term.  
2.6.2 Data 
We use data from three sources. The data on municipal structure characteristics are 
derived from the national surveys of Municipal Form of Government conducted by ICMA 
in 2001, 2006, and 2011. These surveys are by far the most comprehensive resources about 
municipal structure characteristics and political institutions (Coate & Knight, 2011). In 
each survey year, ICMA mails survey questions to all municipalities with population above 
2,500 and to selected ones among the small-sized municipalities. The number of samples 
in the three surveys are 7,867, 8,278, and 8,813. The respective number of responding 
municipalities are 4,244, 3,864, and 3,566 in the three surveys, representing 53.9%, 46.7%, 
and 40.5% of the survey samples. 
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Data on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of municipalities in 2000 
are collected from the Decennial Census 2000; the corresponding data in 2010 are derived 
from the Decennial Census 2010 and the American Community Survey 5-year estimates 
in 2010. The Census Bureau provides instructions to make data from the Decennial Census 
and American Community Survey multiple-year estimates comparable. We apply the 
approach of Coate and Knight (2011) to interpolate the corresponding data in 2005 by using 
the data points in 2000 and 2010. We match the socioeconomic and demographic data in 
2000, 2005, and 2010 with municipal structure data in 2001, 2006, and 2011. 
We only focus on the mayor-council and council-manager municipalities in this 
research. To mitigate selection bias among the small-sized municipalities, we delete the 
samples with population size below 2,500. After dropping observations with missing 
values in the explanatory variables, we obtain a total of 6,777 municipality-year 
observations during the sample period. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel because 
not every municipality replies to all three surveys. Table 1.4 displays the descriptive 
statistics of all explanatory variables. 
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Table 1.4 Descriptive Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variables N Mean S.D. Min Max 
Population size 6,777 28884 80968.65 2501 3694820 
Income inequality 6,777 1.28 0.15 0.99 2.53 
Proportion of blacks (%) 6,777 8.76 14.47 0.01 95.96 
Per capita income (real 2010 dollars) 6,777 27303.07 13054.75 6696.00 142341.70 
Unemployment rate (%) 6,777 6.67 3.44 0.30 41.70 
Labor force in industry of manufacturing (%) 6,777 13.82 7.83 0.25 82.60 
Labor force in industry of PMSA (%) 6,777 8.62 4.25 0.40 29.80 
Educational attainment (high school and above) (%) 6,777 83.53 9.96 22.40 100 
Proportion of foreign-born citizens (%) 6,777 8.40 9.21 0.05 74.70 
Existence of initiative (dummy) 6,777 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Year (2001, 2006, 2011) 6,777 2005.63 4.10 2001 2011 
Region (Northeast, North Central, South, West) 6,777 2.66 0.94 1 4 
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2.7 Empirical Findings 
We first use cross-sectional ordinary least squares to estimate the model in equation 
(1). The results are displayed in column (1) in table 1.5. Over 17% of the variation of the 
municipal structure political-administrative index is captured by the explanatory variables, 
and many estimated effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. The more 
administrative municipal structure is correlated with smaller population size, smaller 
fraction of blacks, higher per capita income, higher unemployment rate, higher level of 
educational attainment, larger fraction of foreign-born citizens, and citizens’ authority of 
initiative. Signs of coefficients of all factors that exert statistically significant effects are 
consistent with hypotheses, except the fraction of foreign-born citizens. Results in table 1.5 
also show that regions of municipalities are correlated with their municipal structures. 
Compared to municipalities in the Northeastern U.S., municipalities in the North Central, 
South, and West are more likely to use a more administrative structure, which is consistent 
with previous findings.8 
8  We also tried to use state dummies, instead of region dummies, in the OLS regression because 
municipalities may have same in-state variations but different cross-state variations. Effects of the 
explanatory variables are similar to that presented in column (1) in table 1.5. 
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Table 1.5 Estimation Results 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Log_Population size -0.0717*** -0.0438*** 0.0737 
(0.0116) (0.0140) (0.0614) 
Log_Income inequality -0.0377 -0.0104 0.208 
(0.105) (0.103) (0.155) 
Log_Proportion of blacks (%) -0.0140* -0.00529 0.0317 
(0.00828) (0.00904) (0.0202) 
Log_Per capita income 0.190*** 0.237*** 0.199* 
(0.0540) (0.0497) (0.101) 
Log_Unemployment rate (%) 0.0928*** 0.0258 1.31e-05 
(0.0269) (0.0202) (0.0242) 
Log_Labor force in manufacturing (%) -0.0228 -0.0138 0.0479 
(0.0172) (0.0193) (0.0378) 
Log_Labor force in PMSA (%) 0.00541 -0.0241 -0.0390 
(0.0294) (0.0261) (0.0356) 
Log_Educational attainment (%) 0.530*** 0.382*** 0.230 
(0.125) (0.123) (0.237) 
Log_Proportion of foreign-born citizens (%) 0.141*** 0.106*** 0.0147 
(0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0229) 
Initiative 0.232*** 0.0572*** -0.0148 
(0.0217) (0.0169) (0.0202) 
Year_2006 (2001 as reference group) -0.0228 -0.0328*** -0.0237 
(0.0249) (0.0119) (0.0146) 
Year_2011 (2001 as reference group) -0.0236 -0.00576 0.0142 
(0.0275) (0.0158) (0.0213) 
North Central (Northeast as reference group) 0.300*** 0.245*** 
(0.0395) (0.0470) 
South (Northeast as reference group) 0.737*** 0.666*** 
(0.0375) (0.0442) 
West (Northeast as reference group) 0.758*** 0.805*** 
(0.0404) (0.0484) 
Constant -4.540*** -4.342*** -3.858** 
(0.510) (0.541) (1.555) 
Observations 6,777 6,777 6,777 
R-squared 0.173 - 0.014 
Municipality fixed effects No No Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of groups - 4,135 4,135 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Even controlling for a group of explanatory variables in the model, some 
unobserved factors, such as local political ideology and cultural preference, may be omitted. 
We therefore add the unobserved and time-invariant factors of municipalities, indicated by 
𝛼𝑖, into the specified model: 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln [𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1)] + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡) 
+𝜃𝑡 + µ(𝑖,𝑡)  (2), 
where 
µ(𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀(𝑖,𝑡)    (3). 
Random effects estimation assumes the unobserved and time-invariant municipal 
characteristics 𝛼𝑡 are uncorrelated with other explanatory factors. However, because the 
time-invariant term 𝛼𝑖 exists in the composite error term, µ𝑖,𝑡 is serially correlated across 
time. The random effect method, which applies generalized least squares (GLS), can 
produce unbiased and consistent estimated effects (Wooldridge, 2015), which are 
displayed in column (2) in table 1.5. Signs of estimated effects remain unchanged (except 
the labor force in PMSA, whose effect is not statistically significant), but statistical 
significance of some variables disappears after controlling for observed and unobserved 
municipal characteristics. Compared to results in column (1), the proportion of blacks and 
unemployment rate produce no statistically significant effects now. The effects of 
population size, per capita income, educational attainment of citizens, proportion of 
citizens born in foreign nations, and citizens’ initiative are statistically significant, and the 
sign of their effects are consistent with hypotheses (except the fraction of foreign-born 
citizens). As with the results in column (1), compared to municipalities in the Northeastern 
U.S., the ones in other three regions are more likely to use the administrative structure. 
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Last, under the strictest assumption, municipality fixed effects estimation allows 
the unobserved and time-invariant variable, 𝛼𝑖 , to be correlated with other explanatory 
factors. The estimated effects using ordinary least squares and random effects are biased 
when there is a correlation between 𝛼𝑖  and 𝑋(𝑖,𝑡−1)  or 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑖,𝑡) . We use the 
municipality fixed effects to estimate the specified model, and only changes are used for 
estimation. The results displayed in column (3) in table 1.5 indicate the effects of changes 
of the explanatory factors on the change of the municipal structure political-administrative 
index. 
Changes of structural characteristics of the samples are seldom and in small-scale 
during the research period (2001-2011), making the variation of the municipal structure 
political-administrative index small. The infrequency and small-scale of municipal 
structure index change partly explains the elimination of many statistically significant 
effects in the fixed effects estimation results. In column (3), only the effect of per capita 
income is still statistically significant. A higher per capita income leads to municipalities 
adopting structures that are more administrative, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
and prior studies. This finding demonstrates the important role citizens’ income level plays 
in determining structural changes of municipalities. The findings mean that the model does 
a better job of accounting for variation in the cross section than it does accounting for 
longitudinal changes of municipal structures. 
2.8 Conclusions 
Conventional wisdom holds that the shift of municipal structures from the mayor-
council to the council-manager form began in the early twentieth century and continued 
until the 1950s, after which the balance between these two forms remained stable (Choi, 
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Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Knoke, 1982). However, based on the Municipal Form of 
Government surveys conducted by ICMA every five years from 1981 to 2011, we find that 
the proportion of the mayor-council form was still declining, reaching the lowest point at 
33% in 2011. In the same year, the fraction of council-manager municipalities increased to 
around 59%. 
Another conspicuous trend in municipal structure adaptations is the development of 
the “Type III City” when municipalities on each of the two statutory platforms adopt 
characteristics of the other (Frederickson & Johnson, 2001; Frederickson, Johnson, & 
Wood, 2004a, 2004b; Frederickson, Wood, & Logan, 2001). The boundary between the 
statutory forms becomes ambiguous. Research can revisit municipal structures by 
observing details in composition of the structure and further explore their determinants 
because municipal structures still matter (Nelson & Svara, 2012). 
We examine seven essential components that can distinguish municipal structures 
and construct a political-administrative index of municipal structures. Examining the 
determinants of municipal structures on the political-administrative dimension is the main 
purpose of this research. 
We summarize the political conflict theory and class cleavage theory from the related 
literature and incorporate these theories into our theoretical model of cost analysis. Citizens 
presumably would like a local government that can be both accountable and efficient. 
However, pursuing one goal will give rise to increasing cost in the other. The political 
municipal structure provides the best approach for citizens to make public officials 
accountable and supplies multiple channels for citizens to express demands and safeguard 
their benefits, but community policy making or implementation interrupted by frequent 
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political conflicts may cause efficiency loss. Alternatively, an administrative structure has 
the potential to achieve efficiency due to professional management, but the concentration 
of authority in the council and the insulation of the appointed professional manager from 
ballot pressure may lead to insufficient ability of citizens to monitor public officials’ 
behavior. 
We argue that citizens with various socioeconomic and demographic backgrounds 
have different preferences towards accountability and efficiency and the corresponding 
monitoring and inefficiency costs. Citizens will tend to choose a municipal structure that 
minimizes the total of the two types of cost. We collect data and use multiple methods to 
test our hypotheses. Empirical results demonstrate that the municipal structure political-
administrative index is tightly associated with citizens’ socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, most of which are consistent with our predictions and previous studies. 
Regarding the changes in municipal structures during the sample period, we find from the 
model controlling for municipality fixed effects that municipalities that have higher per 
capita income are more likely to adapt toward the administrative structure. 
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CHAPTER 3. MUNICIPAL STRUCTURE MATTERS: EVIDENCE FROM GOVERNMENT FISCAL 
PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Municipal structure or form is a basic institutional setting that plays an essential role 
in organizing local politics and influencing public policy formulation and implementation 
(Judd and Swanstrom 2015; Wheeland, Palus, and Wood 2014; Zhang 2014; Zhang and 
Feiock 2009).9 Most U.S. municipalities use either the mayor-council or council-manager 
municipal form.10 Based on the traditional wisdom, in mayor-council municipalities, the 
mayor, as the chief executive officer, is separate from the council and is elected directly 
by voters; the mayor runs administrative affairs; and the council is responsible for 
legislation. In addition, council members are usually elected by district and on a partisan 
basis. In council-manager municipalities, the council runs both administration and 
legislation; the council usually appoints a professional manager as the chief administrative 
officer (CAO) to manage administrative affairs; and the mayor is a ceremonial position 
selected by council members on a rotating basis. The council-manager form is generally 
associated with the nonpartisan and at-large election of council members. 
After the 1950s, cross-adoption of structural characteristics between mayor-council 
and council-manager municipalities was prevalent (Choi, Feiock, and Bae 2013), which 
9 Many studies use the concepts of municipal form and municipal structure interchangeably. This study refers 
to municipal form as the statutory nominal municipal form such as the mayor-council and council-manager. 
Municipal structure is a broader concept, which involves the elements of municipal form and other structural 
characteristics. Details on the differentiations between these two concepts are discussed later. 
10 There are three other statutory nominal municipal forms: commission, town meeting, and representative 
town meeting. These forms are adopted by a small group of municipalities mainly located in the New England 
states. According to the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA, 9.7%, 9.7%, 8.0%, 6.7%, 7.6%, 
6.7%, and 8.0% of the responding municipalities adopted these three forms in 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 2001, 
2006, and 2011, respectively. Like previous studies, this research only involves municipalities with the 
mayor-council and council-manager forms in the analysis. 
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motivated scholars to reclassify municipal form. An important contribution of this research 
is the construction of a municipal structure political-administrative index based on several 
essential structural characteristics that determine governments’ managerial 
professionalism, separation of powers, checks and balances between officials, and local 
electoral systems. 
An on-going literature attempts to evaluate the consequences in government 
performance of variations in municipal form or structure. Carr (2015) systematically 
reviews the extant studies and summarizes ten propositions about the relationship between 
municipal form and government representation and functionality. He concludes that 
evidence on the fundamental assumption that municipal form makes a difference in 
government performance is still relatively small and weaker than many might expect.  Carr 
(2015) encourages scholars to advance research in two approaches: developing a theory to 
explain how municipal form matters in government performance and producing empirical 
evidence to assess the theory. This article practices these approaches through (1) 
theoretically linking municipal structure to government performance based on the rich 
literature on government management and performance and (2) empirically investigating 
if variations in municipal structure matter in government fiscal performance. 
The key research question in this article is whether and how municipal structure 
affects government fiscal conditions. The next section briefly introduces prior works on 
government fiscal conditions. Section two constructs a municipal structure political-
administrative index. Section three proposes hypotheses based on theoretical analyses. 
Section four introduces the methodology. Section five discusses the empirical findings, 
and the last section concludes. 
41 
3.2 Related Literature on Government Fiscal Conditions 
Most studies in the related literature focus on the measurement of government fiscal 
conditions, validity and reliability of fiscal condition indicators, determinants of 
government fiscal conditions, and consequences of and countermeasures to fiscal crises. 
So far, there are no universally accepted reliable and valid indicators of government 
fiscal conditions. Among a variety of existing measurements, the most frequently cited 
include the Fiscal Trend Monitoring System (FTMS) by the International City/County 
Management Association (ICMA) (Groves, Godsey, and Shulman 1981; Nollenberger 
2003), Brown’s 10-point test and the revised edition (Brown 1993; Maher and 
Nollenberger 2009), the four-solvency approach by Wang, Dennis, and Tu (2007), and the 
10-point scale approach by Kloha, Weissert, and Kleine (2005). These indicators capture 
a comprehensive picture of government fiscal conditions by examining the revenue, 
expenditure, budgetary balance, debt, long-term liability, and asset maintenance (Gorina, 
Maher, and Joffe 2018). 
In-depth understanding of the determinants of government fiscal conditions assists 
officials in effectively resolving fiscal problems (Coe 2008; Maher and Deller 2007, 
2013a). McDonald (2015) constructs a government fiscal condition determinants model in 
an open system framework that involves explanatory factors of politics, economics, 
demographics, and government characteristics. The empirical results show the partisan 
affiliation of registered voters, educational attainment and income level of local citizens, 
the unemployment rate, racial composition of citizens, government revenue sources, 
population size, and the charter form of county governments matter for Florida counties’ 
fiscal conditions. 
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Gorina, Maher, and Joffe (2018) construct an action-based measure of local 
government fiscal distress. The authors operationalize fiscal distress as “actions, often 
disruptive and politically unpopular, that a government takes because it is unable to meet 
its fundamental operating needs and service requirements.” (p. 81). The authors use a 
variety of indicators that are commonly employed by scholars as the direct measurements 
of government fiscal conditions, such as cash solvency, budgetary solvency, and long-term 
solvency, to predict governments’ certain disruptive and politically unpopular actions. 
Jimenez (2017) investigates the effect of managerial networking on the fiscal health 
of local governments from a perspective of the management-performance linkage. His 
results demonstrate a concave relationship between the managerial networking of city 
managers and government budgetary solvency. City managers’ ties with external 
stakeholders do help improve governments’ budgetary solvency at the beginning. But too 
frequent interactions with external stakeholders constrain managers’ decisions in fiscal 
management and exacerbate government fiscal difficulties. 
There are many limitations in the literature on the determinants of government fiscal 
conditions. Research samples in empirical studies are often derived from one single or a 
few states (Gorina, Maher, and Joffe 2018; McDonald 2015). Usage of one-year cross-
sectional data is common (Maher and Deller 2013b). Moreover, few previous studies apply 
the rich literature on government management and performance to explain the effect of 
municipal structure on government fiscal conditions (Carr 2015; Ingraham, Joyce, and 
Donahue 2003). This research advances the related literature in these aspects. 
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3.3 Measuring Municipal Structure on a Political-Administrative Scale 
Municipal structure is the explanatory variable of interest in the determinant model 
of government fiscal conditions in this research. Previous studies generally adopt a binary 
variable to indicate the primary municipal structure as the mayor-council or council-
manager. However, prevalent cross-adoption of structural characteristics between 
municipalities makes a dichotomous classification problematic. Scholars have attempted 
to use different methods to reclassify municipal form into multiple categories based on a 
variety of structural characteristics (Carr and Karuppusamy 2008, 2009, 2010; DeSantis 
and Renner 2002; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004a, 2004b; Hansell 1999; Nelson 
and Svara 2010). 
Nelson and Svara (2010) assert the importance of distinguishing adaptation of 
municipal models versus variation in municipal form at the conceptual level. In their 
viewpoint, the municipal model involves elements that not only characterize municipal 
form but differentiate local electoral systems and other structural characteristics. In this 
vein, municipal model is a broader concept than municipal form. The typology of Nelson 
and Svara (2010) starts from the stated nominal mayor-council or council-manager 
municipal form and examines three structural features: how the mayor is selected, whether 
a CAO exists, and who appoints the CAO. They classify the mayor-council form into four 
categories: mayor and council-administrator, mayor-council-administrator, mayor-
administrator-council, and classic mayor-council. The council-manager form is classified 
into three categories: council (mayor)-manager, mayor-council-manager, and empowered 
mayor council-manager. The seven categories of municipal form “represent a progression 
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from low centralized political leadership and high professional autonomy to high political 
leadership and low professional autonomy.” (Nelson and Svara 2010, p. 558). 
Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) and Carr and Karuppusamy (2008, 
2009, 2010) classify municipal structure by examining a broader range of structural 
characteristics, including all the elements examined by Nelson and Svara (2010), features 
of the electoral system, allocation of powers, among other characteristics. The “Type III 
City” framework of Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2004a, 2004b) classifies municipal 
structure into three groups: the political, the administrative, and the adapted structure. Carr 
and Karuppusamy (2008, 2009, 2010) modify the “Type III City” framework and classify 
the mayor-council form into the political, the adapted political, and the conciliated political, 
and classify the council-manager form into the conciliated administrative, the adapted 
administrative, and the administrative. The nature of these reclassified municipal forms 
ranges in an order from the most political to the most administrative. 
3.3.1 Municipal Structure Political-Administrative Index 
The approach to classify municipal structure in this article absorbs merits of the 
two previous typologies. Applying the terminology of Nelson and Svara (2010), the focus 
is more on the adaptation of municipal models than the variation of municipal form itself. 
Therefore, the theory here does not claim to classify the municipal form in the conventional 
sense. Instead, the typology aims to involve the most essential structural characteristics that 
determine the managerial professionalism, assignment of powers, and local electoral 
systems to measure the nature of municipal structure on a political-administration scale. 
Table 2.1 presents the seven structural characteristics that are examined. The number of 
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municipalities in the sample (N=6,786) with each structural characteristic is reported in 
parentheses. 
Table 2.1 Standards of constructing the municipal structure political-administrative index 
Structural characteristics\coded values 0 0.5 1 
Stated nominal form Mayor-council 
(N=2,544) 
Council-manager 
(N=4,242) 
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer No 
(N=1,062) 
Yes 
(N=5,724) 
Mayor election method Direct election 
(N= 5,539) 
Non-direct election 
(N=1,247) 
Mayor is independent of council Yes 
(N=2,144) 
No 
(N=4,642) 
Authority of mayor to veto council decisions Yes 
(N=2,058) 
No 
(N=4,728) 
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members Partisan 
(N=1,047) 
Nonpartisan 
(N=5,739) 
At-large or by-district election of council members By-district 
(N=1,138) 
Combination 
(N=1,453) 
At-large 
(N=4,195) 
The stated nominal form, mayor-council or council-manager, is the statutory 
structural setting. The other six structural characteristics measure three dimensions of the 
political or administrative nature of municipal structure. The election method of the mayor, 
independence of the mayor from the council, and the veto power of the mayor on council 
decisions determine the separation of powers and checks and balances between officials. 
The existence of a CAO characterizes the degree of managerial professionalism. The two 
features of the election of council members measure the influence of parties and special 
interests on local elections. 
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Each structural characteristic is assigned a numerical value (0, 0.5, or 1), with a 
lower value indicating the more political nature and a higher value indicating the more 
administrative nature. Factor analysis (refer to table 2.3) of the seven coded values 
produces a municipal structure political-administrative index. A lower index indicates a 
more political municipal structure and a higher index means a more administrative 
municipal structure. Data on municipalities’ structural characteristics are collected from 
the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA in 2001, 2006, and 2011. Among all 
municipality samples in the dataset, the municipal structure political-administrative index 
ranges from -1.92 to 1.72 with mean 0 and standard deviation 0.86. 
3.3.2 Index Reliability 
The common method to assess the reliability of an index is to evaluate its 
“dependability, stability, consistency, reproducibility and lack of distortion.” (Kerlinger 
and Lee 2000). The seven components of municipal structure index are objective features 
for assessing the political or administrative nature of municipal structure. Municipality 
samples in ICMA’s surveys are selected based on their population size. In each survey year, 
ICMA mails survey questions to all municipalities with population size above 2,500 and 
to selected small-sized municipalities. To mitigate selection bias, only the municipalities 
with population size above 2,500 are included in the analysis. The response rates of 
ICMA’s surveys in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are around 50%. The data for constructing the 
index are accessible from ICMA. Therefore, the results are reproducible. The form of 
ICMA’s survey questions is uniform across time. This improves the uniformity and 
consistency of the data sources. Moreover, ICMA’s surveys have been conducted every 
five years. Time series data make the index more dependable (Clark 2015). 
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A useful technique to assess reliability of an index is to evaluate the correlation 
between index components. Table 2.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for each 
pair of the index components in sample and the statistical significance level. The 
components are positively correlated with each other at the 0.01 level, providing strong 
evidence of reliability. 
Table 2.2 Correlation matrix of index components 
a b c d e f g 
a 1 
b 0.5445*** 1 
c 0.3352*** 0.1887*** 1 
d 0.4834*** 0.3311*** 0.3118*** 1 
e 0.4731*** 0.3291*** 0.2907*** 0.5839*** 1 
f 0.3164*** 0.2663*** 0.1258*** 0.2055*** 0.1992*** 1 
g 0.2225*** 0.1814*** 0.1835*** 0.2897*** 0.3070*** 0.1168*** 1 
Notes: Sample size is 6,786. ***p<0.01. a = stated nominal form; b = existence of 
Chief Administrative Officer; c = mayor election method; d = mayor is independent of 
council; e = authority of mayor to veto council decisions; f = partisan or nonpartisan 
election of council members; g = at-large or by-district election of council members. 
Another technique to evaluate the reliability of an index is to calculate the value of 
Cronbach’s alpha, which ranges between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating a closer 
correlation between components of an index (Clark 2015). The value of Cronbach’s alpha 
is 0.76, indicating an acceptable reliability of the municipal structure index (Berman and 
Wang 2017). 
3.3.3 Index Validity 
“With validity, the goal is to figure out if we are measuring the concept that we 
intended to measure.” (Clark 2015, p. 72). Validity of the index is assessed in three aspects: 
content validity, criterion-related validity, and construct validity. 
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Content validity requires that components of the index should include all possible 
items that can measure the core concept (Kerlinger and Lee 2000), and there should be 
evidence from the literature demonstrating the efficacy of these items in measuring the 
concept. The requirement of “all possible items” is extremely strict that can be satisfied 
only theoretically. There may be dozens of potential index components (structural 
characteristics). However, it is necessary to balance thoroughness with parsimony and to 
consider data availability. The seven components involved in classifying municipal 
structure are well discussed in the literature. Therefore, it is safe to use them to construct 
the municipal structure index. 
Criterion-related validity requires the constructed index to be correlated with other 
potential measures of the same concept. The stated nominal municipal form, mayor-council 
or council-manager, is traditionally used as a binary measurement of municipal structure. 
In the traditional wisdom, the former is a political structure and the latter is an 
administrative structure. The positive and statistically significant correlations between the 
stated nominal municipal form with the other index components, which are reported in the 
first column in table 2.2, support the criterion-related validity of the index. 
Construct validity is usually assessed by theoretically relating components of the 
index to the concept to be measured. Also, construct validity asks “which factors account 
for the variance in performance of the thing we are trying to measure?” (Clark 2015, p. 73). 
The grounds on which the seven structural characteristics have political or administrative 
nature have been discussed thoroughly by previous studies. The more political municipal 
structure underscores separation of powers and checks and balances between the mayor 
and council members, direct responsiveness and accountability of the mayor to voters, and 
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influence of parties and special interests on local elections. To the contrary, the more 
administrative municipal structure highlights professional management of municipal 
affairs, concentration of powers in the council, and elimination of partisan and special 
interests’ influence on elections. 
Finally, factor analysis is used to assess whether the seven components of the 
municipal structure index are appropriately loaded. Factor analysis reports only one factor 
with an eigenvalue greater than one (2.24), demonstrating that the components of the index 
measure a single core concept. Factor loadings of the principal factor are presented in table 
2.3. The principal factor has positive loadings for all the seven components, among which 
the stated nominal form, existence of a CAO, whether the mayor is independent of the 
council, and authority of the mayor to veto council decisions are highly loaded. 
Table 2.3 Loadings of the principal factor after factor analysis 
Index components Principal Factor Uniqueness 
Stated nominal form 0.7319 0.4304 
Existence of Chief Administrative Officer 0.5681 0.6062 
Mayor selection method 0.4211 0.8159 
Mayor is independent of council 0.6870 0.4928 
Authority of mayor to veto council decisions 0.6798 0.4996 
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council members 0.3566 0.8377 
At-large or by-district election of council members 0.3747 0.8368 
3.4 Theoretical Analyses and Hypotheses 
We can propose at least three reasons that municipal structure might affect 
government performance. Municipal structure ought to affect the managerial 
professionalism of government. Professionalism and officials’ behavior motivation in turn 
can affect governments’ managerial strategy stance. Finally, municipal structure ought to 
affect the relative attention of officials to managerial efficiency versus accountability. 
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3.4.1 Managerial Professionalism and Government Performance 
The administrative municipal structure is characterized by the existence of expert 
managers (CAOs) in the managerial system. Previous studies have found the important role 
of and the substantial degree of professional autonomy held by the CAO in policy making 
and implementation (Demir and Reddick 2012; Nalbandian 1999; Nelson and Svara 2015; 
Selden, Brewer, and Brudney 1999; Zhang 2014; Zhang and Feiock 2010). 
Differentiations in the career path and primary behavior motivation of elected 
officials and appointed professional managers result in different degrees of managerial 
professionalism in dealing with government affairs. The primary motivation of elected 
officials, whose career is generally determined by vote results in elections, is to win 
popularity by catering to voters’ demands. Thus, acting responding to the dynamic 
preferences of voters is presumably the most essential part of their works. The political 
motivation of catering to groups that can contribute more political support encourages 
elected officials to invest a substantial amount of resources in public programs that might 
not produce the maximum level of marginal benefits and, hence, creates government 
inefficiencies. 
However, the appointed CAO must focus on not only voters’ demands, which are 
expressed through mandates of elected officials, but also the pressure of building an 
outstanding reputation among peers in professional organizations, such as the International 
City/County Management Association and Government Finance Officers Association 
(Dunn and Legge 2001). Local governments usually select professional managers based on 
their managerial experiences and reputations. For the appointed professional managers, the 
presumably most important task is to search for innovations and improve managerial skills 
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to solve local problems. Moreover, appointed managers are usually trained experts who are 
equipped with managerial knowledge and information advantages, which facilitate 
government management in a more professional way. 
Managerial professionalism promotes government fiscal performance via 
improving the quality of budget making, capital planning, investment of public funds, and 
usage of debt financing. Professional managers are presumably more capable of preparing 
government budgets based on the generally accepted accounting principles, forecasting 
revenues and expenditures accurately with advanced techniques, implementing multiple-
year budgeting and capital plans, making using of capital markets more reasonably, and 
diversifying revenue sources strategically. These capacities have great potentials to 
improve government fiscal performance. 
3.4.2 Managerial Strategy Stance and Government Performance 
Organizational performance is the result of interaction between external 
environments and internal strategic management (Boyne and Walker 2010). Factors of the 
external environment, such as the population size, racial and ethnic characteristics of 
citizens, and local political ideology, are generally beyond the control of government 
officials. What officials are at discretion to a larger extent is the adjustment of strategic 
management in running the government. Boyne and Walker (2004) develop a strategy 
content matrix along two dimensions: strategy stances and strategy actions. The former 
refers to the generic approach that describes organizations’ position and how they respond 
to environments to maintain or improve their performance, and the latter identifies the 
range of specific actions by organizations to operationalize the strategy stance (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2006; Boyne and Walker 2004). 
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Boyne and Walker (2004) classify the strategy stance of public organizations into 
prospecting, defending, and reacting. Prospectors are more likely to be pioneers and search 
for innovations and new approaches to deal with emerging environmental trends (Andrews, 
Boyne, and Walker 2006). Defenders usually take a conservative viewpoint toward 
innovations and “focus on a narrow range of services, their core activities, to retain their 
existing portfolio of activities and protect their share of the public budget from attacks by 
predatory organizations.” (Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006, p. 53). Lastly, reactors 
generally do not maintain a consistent stance in organizational operation and tend to adjust 
strategies according to the dynamic environmental pressures (Boyne and Walker 2004). 
Previous studies have found a positive correlation between prospecting and public 
organizations’ performance (Andrews et al. 2005; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006) and 
a negative relationship between reacting and the performance of public organizations 
(Andrews et al. 2008; Andrews, Boyne, and Walker 2006). 
Under the more political municipal structure, separation of powers forces the mayor 
and council members to negotiate and compromise with each other in order to achieve their 
desired policy goals. Council members selected on a partisan and district basis have a 
higher motivation to cater to special interest groups and political supporters in specific 
districts, and they are inclined to be more sensitive to external political pressures from 
parties and demands of voters. Officials under the more political municipal structure will 
be more likely to be reactors in strategy stance. In contrast, under the administrative 
municipal structure with unified powers concentrated in the council, collaboration inside 
the managerial system and assistance from professional managers in government operating 
facilitate adoption of innovations (Nelson and Svara 2012). In municipalities where at-
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large elections are implemented and partisan influence is eliminated, professional 
autonomy is promoted. Therefore, officials are more likely to adopt innovative managerial 
practices and techniques, and they can be presumably described as prospectors in strategy 
stance. The theoretical linkage between municipal structure and strategy stance together 
with empirical evidence on the correlation between strategy stance and government 
performance imply that municipalities with a more administrative structure will have better 
fiscal performance. 
Based on the two mechanisms described, there may be a linear relationship between 
the constructed municipal structure political-administrative index and indicators of 
government fiscal performance. Higher index values are correlated with a higher degree of 
managerial professionalism and a higher probability of adopting prospecting in managerial 
strategy stance and, thus, better government fiscal performance. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive correlation between the municipal 
structure political-administrative index and government fiscal conditions, 
all else being equal. 
3.4.3 Managerial Accountability versus Efficiency 
Accountability here is defined as the responsiveness and adherence of public 
officials to citizens’ preferences for public policies and demands for public services (Dunn 
and Legge 2001). Like many previous studies, this article defines efficiency as the capacity 
of government officials in improving professional management to enhance public resource 
utilization (Hayes and Chang 1990). Managerial efficiency makes it feasible for 
governments to spend fewer resources to provide a certain amount of public services. 
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Accountability of public officials to citizens helps mitigate the agency problem and prevent 
government corruption. 
Assume that an optimal municipal structure that is potentially correlated with best 
government performance can delegate government management to professional experts for 
efficiency gains while holding public officials accountable to citizens (Putnam, Leonardi, 
and Nanetti 1994; Shepsle 1988). Under a more administrative or professional municipal 
structure, delegating government management to expert managers can potentially improve 
managerial efficiency (Deno and Mehay 1987; Hayes and Chang 1990). However, it 
increases the difficulty of holding the managers accountable because they are not placed 
under the direct ballot pressure of voters and they hold information and skill advantages 
over voters and elected officials. Meanwhile, concentration of powers in the council 
weakens checks and balances between the mayor and council members. Therefore, voters’ 
monitoring cost over officials increases. On the other hand, under a more political 
municipal structure, government management by the directly elected officials, who tend to 
put priority on political responsiveness and winning elections, helps assure accountability. 
However, managerial inefficiency may raise due to insufficient professional management 
and increasing political struggles. In this vein, an optimal municipal structure may be the 
one that mixes the political and administrative structural characteristics in combination. 
Similar inference is obtained in the analysis of managerial strategy stance. 
Although there is evidence showing that reacting is detrimental to organizational 
performance, it may not be the worst strategy stance for governments because of their 
public nature. Actively adopting innovations by prospectors can potentially improve 
managerial practices, but failure to respond in a timely way to environmental dynamics 
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may result in accountability problem, loss of political support, and poor policy performance. 
In contrast, reactors may be hesitant to innovate, but their adherence to political principals 
and prompt adjustments of actions in accordance with external environments help them 
achieve more political support and prevent risks. Therefore, a strategy stance that mixes 
prospecting and reacting may combine advantages from both and lead to best government 
performance. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a curvilinear relationship between the 
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal 
conditions, presenting an inverted U-shaped relationship, all else being 
equal. 
Local governments’ fiscal conditions are shaped by the external environment 
interacted with internal government management (Cabaleiro, Buch, and Vaamonde 2013; 
Hendrick 2004). In addition to the direct effect of municipal structure on governments’ 
fiscal performance, municipal structure can interact with factors of external environments 
to exert indirect or moderating effect. 
Hypothesis 3: The municipal structure political-administrative 
index moderates the effects of external environmental factors on 
government fiscal conditions, all else being equal. 
3.5 Methodology 
3.5.1 Model Specification 
Indicators of fiscal conditions are first modeled as a function of the direct effect of 
municipal structure and control variables to test Hypothesis 1. 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (1). 
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𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 refers to indicators of government fiscal conditions in municipality 𝑖 and in 
year 𝑡 . 𝑆𝐸 , 𝐹 , 𝐼 , and 𝑆  indicate the factors of socioeconomic characteristics of 
municipalities or citizens, fiscal environments, institutional constraints, and the municipal 
structure political-administrative index, respectively. The intercept is α, the estimated 
parameters are 𝛽, γ, δ, λ, and the error term is 𝜀. The explanatory variables take a one-year 
lag.11 
Model (1) is expanded to include a square of the municipal structure index to test 
the inverted U-shaped relationship in Hypothesis 2. 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆1𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆2𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (2). 
The multiplicative interaction regression model is used to test Hypothesis 3. All the 
factors of the external environment (socioeconomic, fiscal, and institutional) can interact 
with the municipal structure index. All constitutive terms of the interaction items should 
be included in the multiplicative interaction model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005). 
𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
𝛿𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 × 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3). 
3.5.2 Data Collection 
Data on municipal structural characteristics are derived from the Municipal Form 
of Government national surveys conducted by ICMA in 2001, 2006, and 2011. The survey 
samples in 2001, 2006, and 2011 are 7,867, 8,278, and 8,813, respectively, with response 
rates around 50%. 
11 Some of the socioeconomic and fiscal variables have a two-year lag instead of one (see the section on data 
collection). 
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Data on socioeconomic characteristics in 2000 are collected from the Decennial 
Census 2000. The corresponding data in 2010 are collected from the Decennial Census 
2010 and supplemented by the American Community Survey 5-year estimates in 2010. The 
Census Bureau provides instructions for merging data accurately from these two sources. 
Data in 2005 are linearly interpolated using data points in 2000 and 2010, which is a 
commonly used data processing method (Coate and Knight 2011). Government finance 
data are collected from the U.S. Census Bureau government finance surveys in 2002, 2007, 
and 2012. In years ending with 2 and 7, the surveys cover almost all municipalities. 
The government fiscal condition indicators are calculated based on the Census 
government finance data. The Census government finance data in 2002 are matched with 
municipal structure data in 2001 and Census socioeconomics data in 2000. The 
corresponding data in 2007, 2006, and 2005 are matched, as are the corresponding data in 
2012, 2011, and 2010. 
Part of the fiscal (governmental functions in public health, social service, and public 
school) and institutional (balanced budget requirement and debt limit) factors are coded 
according to Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001). The data are coded based on state-imposed 
regulations on municipalities. In addition, data on the tax and expenditure limitations 
(TELs) stringency index are collected and updated based on Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann 
(2009). 
Like most previous studies, only the mayor-council and council-manager 
municipalities with population size over 2,500 are involved in the analysis to mitigate 
selection bias in the municipal structure surveys. The final dataset is an unbalanced panel 
because the Municipal Form of Government survey respondents differ in each survey year. 
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3.5.3 Indicators of Government Fiscal Conditions 
This article draws on measurements used by previous studies to operationalize 
government fiscal conditions. Considering data availability and practical feasibility, a 
constructive approach is to select a group of indicators that are commonly used and 
intuitively reasonable to capture a comprehensive picture of government fiscal conditions 
in several aspects. Government fiscal conditions are measured by four indicators: cash 
solvency, dependence on intergovernmental transfers, debt level, and balance of the 
operating budget. 
Cash solvency manifests governments’ ability to realize liquidity to provide public 
services in the short-term. Per capita total cash and securities at the end of a fiscal year is 
used as an indicator of municipal governments’ cash solvency. A higher value of the 
indicator signals healthier fiscal conditions. The percentage of intergovernmental revenues 
to total revenues is an indicator of dependence on intergovernmental transfers. Undue 
reliance on revenues from other governments damages fiscal autonomy and presumably 
indicates a weaker ability of the government to provide public services and fulfil fiscal 
obligations using its own resources. Therefore, a lower value of the percentage reflects 
healthier fiscal conditions. Governments usually resort to the capital market to maintain 
normal operating of the government or to fund capital projects. The ratio of total debt 
outstanding at the end of a fiscal year to general revenues is an applicable indicator of debt 
level. A lower value of the ratio indicates healthier fiscal conditions. Balance of the 
operating budget reflects the ability of governments to collect sufficient revenues to 
provide mandatory general services in a fiscal year. The focus in this article is the operating 
budget, excluding the capital budget which generally involves a multiple-year capital plan 
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and is funded by the long-term debt. The operating budget balance is measured as the 
percentage of general budget surplus or deficit to general revenues. An operating budget 
surplus indicates healthier fiscal conditions. 
3.5.4 Control Variables 
Selection of control variables is based on evidence from previous studies and data 
availability. The factors of socioeconomics include the population size, mean household 
income, unemployment rate, fraction of residents above 65 years old, and local industrial 
structures. These factors affect government fiscal conditions by determining government 
revenue collections and spending needs (Hendrick 2004; Jacob and Hendrick 2012). 
Particularly, the industrial structure is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) 
expressed as follows (Suyderhoud 1994): 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
1−(∑ 𝑋𝑗,𝑖,𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1
2
1−
1
𝑛
 (3), 
where 𝑖 indicates municipality, 𝑡 refers to time, and 𝑋𝑗 specifies the fraction of labor force 
in industry 𝑗  out of  𝑛  industries. 12  HHI ranges between 0 and 1, with a higher value 
indicating a more diversified industry structure. 
The fiscal factors include municipalities’ fiscal functions and revenue structures. 
Dummy variables are used to indicate municipalities’ functions in public health, social 
services, and public schools to account for variations in service responsibilities of 
12  Based on the classification by the Census Bureau, there are thirteen industries in local economies: 
agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retail 
trade; transportation and warehousing, and utilities; information; finance, insurance, real estate, and rental 
and leasing; professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services; 
educational, health and social services; arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services; 
other services (except public administration); and public administration. 
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municipal governments across states (Krane, Rigos, and Hill 2001).13 The model includes 
the diversity index (HHI) of municipalities’ general revenues and tax revenues to control 
for the effect of revenue diversification on governments’ fiscal conditions.14 
Local governments generally do not possess full fiscal autonomy over their fiscal 
behavior (McDonald 2015; Rose 2010). The factors of institutional constraints controlled 
for in the estimation model include the TELs stringency index and dummy variables for 
the balanced budget requirement (BBR) and debt limit. Descriptive statistics of fiscal 
condition indicators and control variables, their measurements, and the data sources are 
presented in table 2.4. 
13 Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001) classify municipal government functions into nine categories, including 
general government, public safety, public health, public works, social services, economic development, 
physical environment, culture and recreation, and public schools. This study controls only three of them in 
the model because almost all municipalities across states have functions in the other six categories. 
14  Based on the classification by the Census Bureau, the categories of general revenues include 
intergovernmental revenues, total taxes, current charges, and miscellaneous general revenues. The categories 
of tax revenues include property tax revenues, sale tax revenues, license tax revenues, and others. 
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Table 2.4 Variable names, descriptive statistics, and data sources 
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max Data sources 
Fiscal condition indicators 
Cash solvency (real 2013 dollars) 6,767 1454.23 3061.02 0 102628.50 CGFD 
Dependence on intergovernmental transfers (%) 6,750 16.74 13.19 0 94.80 CGFD 
Debt level (ratio) 6,579 1.24 1.52 0 66.16 CGFD 
Operating budget balance (%) 6,785 1.15 21.76 -307.86 91.10 CGFD 
Socioeconomic factors 
Population size 6,786 29104 80186 2501 3694820 DC and ACS 
Average household income (real 2013 dollars) 6,786 71257.68 36857.98 26223.57 431349.70 DC and ACS 
Unemployment rate (%) 6,786 6.72 3.47 0.30 41.70 DC and ACS 
Fraction of residents over 65 years old (%) 6,786 14.46 5.93 1.44 68.70 DC and ACS 
Structure of local industries 6,786 0.94 0.03 0.34 0.98 DC and ACS 
Fiscal factors 
Function in public health (dummy) 6,786 0.45 0.50 0 1 KRH (2001) 
Function in social service (dummy) 6,786 0.37 0.48 0 1 KRH (2001) 
Function in public school (dummy) 6,786 0.23 0.42 0 1 KRH (2001) 
Structure of general revenues 6,786 0.81 0.14 0 1 CGFD 
Structure of tax revenues 6,786 0.51 0.26 0 1 CGFD 
Institutional factors 
BBR (dummy) 6,786 0.62 0.49 0 1 KRH (2001) 
Debt limit (dummy) 6,786 0.78 0.41 0 1 KRH (2001) 
TELs stringency index 6,786 20.21 10.58 0 38 ADS (2009) 
Notes: Cash solvency is measured by per capita total cash and securities at the end of a fiscal year. Dependence on intergovernmental 
transfers is measured as the percentage of intergovernmental revenues to total revenues. Debt level is measured as the ratio of total debt 
outstanding at the end of a fiscal year to general revenues. Operating budget balance is measured as the percentage of general budget surplus or 
deficit to general revenues. CGFD: Census government finance dataset; DC: Decennial Census; ACS: American Community Survey multiple-year 
estimates; KRH: Krane, Rigos, and Hill (2001); ADS: Amiel, Deller, and Stallmann (2009).
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3.6 Empirical Results 
3.6.1 Direct Effect of Municipal Structure 
Results of regressing model (1) with year fixed effects and robust standard errors 
are presented in the first four columns in Panel A of table 2.5. The dependent variable in 
each of the four columns is the four indicators of fiscal conditions, respectively. Column 
(1) shows that the municipal structure political-administrative index has a positive and 
statistically significant correlation with per capita total cash and securities at the end of a 
fiscal year. The index ranges from -1.92 to 1.71. In column (1), the dependent variable 
takes a log form. Therefore, holding other explanatory variables constant, when municipal 
structure adjusts from the most political to the most administrative, per capita total cash 
and securities increased by around 22 percent. Column (2) shows that the municipal 
structure index is negatively correlated with governments’ dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers and the effect is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. A 
smaller value of the dependent variable in column (2) means healthier fiscal conditions. 
Therefore, the results indicate that the administrative municipal structure is associated with 
better fiscal performance based on dependence on intergovernmental revenues. Holding 
other explanatory variables constant, when municipal structure adjusts from the most 
political to the most administrative, the percentage of intergovernmental transfers to total 
revenues decreases by about 5 percentage points. Results in columns (3) and (4) show that 
the correlations between the municipal structure index and governments’ debt level and 
general budget balance are not statistically significant. 
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Table 2.5 Direct effect of municipal structure and the inverted U-shaped relationship 
Panel A Direct effect of municipal structure (Model 1) Panel B Inverted U-shaped relationship test (Model 2) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Cash 
solvency 
Intergov. 
revenue 
dependence 
Debt level General 
budget 
Surplus/deficit 
Cash 
solvency 
Intergov. 
revenue 
dependence 
Debt level General 
budget 
Surplus/deficit 
Municipal structure index 0.0602*** -1.275*** 0.0312 0.304 0.0362* -0.869*** -0.0844** 0.476 
(0.0137) (0.210) (0.0208) (0.324) (0.0197) (0.292) (0.0395) (0.491) 
Municipal structure index^2 -0.0322* 0.546* -0.155*** 0.232 
(0.0190) (0.288) (0.0357) (0.474) 
Socioeconomic factors 
Population size (log) 0.230*** -0.0813 0.0591*** -0.319 0.233*** -0.128 0.0725*** -0.340 
(0.0105) (0.158) (0.0197) (0.247) (0.0105) (0.157) (0.0188) (0.249) 
Mean household income (log) 0.285*** 0.0850 -0.203*** 1.981* 0.285*** 0.0834 -0.205*** 1.979* 
(0.0402) (0.627) (0.0622) (1.073) (0.0402) (0.626) (0.0621) (1.073) 
Unemployment rate -0.126*** 2.323*** -0.145*** 0.738 -0.124*** 2.297*** -0.138*** 0.727 
(0.0287) (0.403) (0.0475) (0.699) (0.0287) (0.403) (0.0478) (0.699) 
Fraction of residents over 65 0.262*** 0.192 -0.254*** -1.762** 0.267*** 0.108 -0.231*** -1.797** 
(0.0287) (0.373) (0.0409) (0.762) (0.0289) (0.376) (0.0420) (0.768) 
Structure of local industries -1.399*** -1.419 0.0879 -0.669 -1.417*** -1.097 0.00378 -0.534 
(0.400) (5.275) (0.505) (8.064) (0.400) (5.273) (0.509) (8.085) 
Fiscal factors 
Function in public health 0.0300 1.843*** -0.0268 3.387*** 0.0329 1.795*** -0.0117 3.367*** 
(0.0299) (0.430) (0.0402) (0.816) (0.0300) (0.433) (0.0398) (0.821) 
Function in social service -0.185*** -5.496*** 0.253*** -0.669 -0.188*** -5.455*** 0.242*** -0.652 
(0.0290) (0.418) (0.0386) (0.788) (0.0291) (0.420) (0.0391) (0.793) 
Function in public school 0.0955*** 2.037*** 0.0147 -2.298*** 0.0922*** 2.091*** -0.000722 -2.274*** 
(0.0276) (0.453) (0.0427) (0.748) (0.0276) (0.455) (0.0430) (0.744) 
Structure of general revenues 0.844*** 13.52*** 0.834*** -9.294*** 0.841*** 13.57*** 0.820*** -9.277*** 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
(0.108) (1.593) (0.179) (1.995) (0.108) (1.592) (0.178) (1.995) 
Structure of tax revenues -0.110** -7.564*** 0.0142 1.762 -0.113** -7.510*** -0.00157 1.784* 
(0.0465) (0.678) (0.0790) (1.076) (0.0466) (0.676) (0.0778) (1.074) 
Institutional factors 
BBR -0.118*** -4.106*** -0.121*** -1.934*** -0.122*** -4.040*** -0.139*** -1.906*** 
(0.0256) (0.357) (0.0373) (0.594) (0.0257) (0.360) (0.0385) (0.598) 
Debt limit -0.146*** -2.029*** -0.0913** -0.226 -0.146*** -2.029*** -0.0917** -0.226 
(0.0277) (0.419) (0.0417) (0.700) (0.0277) (0.418) (0.0415) (0.700) 
TELs stringency index 0.00516*** -0.134*** -0.00255 0.0388 0.00546*** -0.139*** -0.00115 0.0367 
(0.00111) (0.0169) (0.00172) (0.0272) (0.00113) (0.0173) (0.00181) (0.0276) 
2006 (2001 as reference) 0.446*** -2.374*** 0.146*** 1.140* 0.444*** -2.356*** 0.141*** 1.148* 
(0.0266) (0.369) (0.0471) (0.670) (0.0266) (0.369) (0.0476) (0.669) 
2011 (2001 as reference) 0.676*** -2.437*** 0.302*** 1.161* 0.673*** -2.393*** 0.289*** 1.181* 
(0.0280) (0.413) (0.0546) (0.659) (0.0280) (0.414) (0.0557) (0.660) 
Constant 1.469** 15.15* 3.066*** -8.180 1.465** 15.19* 3.077*** -8.143 
(0.634) (9.078) (0.924) (14.85) (0.633) (9.079) (0.924) (14.85) 
Observations 6,758 6,750 6,579 6,785 6,758 6,750 6,579 6,785 
R-squared 0.205 0.120 0.026 0.015 0.205 0.121 0.029 0.015 
Notes: Results in Panel A and B are obtained by estimating models (1) and (2), respectively. Refer to table 2.4 for the 
measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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3.6.2 Inverted U-shaped Relationship 
Model (2) is estimated to test Hypothesis 2, producing results reported in the last 
four columns in Panel B of table 2.5. Column (5) shows that the estimated effects of the 
municipal structure index and its square are positive and negative, respectively, and both 
are statistically significant. Taken together, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between the municipal structure index and government fiscal conditions based on cash 
solvency. Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the correlation to facilitate interpretation. Based 
on the coefficients, the curve reaches the peak at the index around 0.56. Figure 2.1 
illustrates that as the municipal structure adjusts from the most political to the most 
administrative, governments’ cash solvency improves and then declines, presenting an 
inverted U-shape. The results support Hypothesis 2. 
Figure 2.1 Predicted log of per capita total cash and securities with 95% CI 
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Similarly, column (6) shows that the estimated effects of the municipal structure 
index and its square are negative and positive, respectively. Both are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. Governments’ dependence on intergovernmental transfers declines 
until the municipal structure index reaches around 0.80 and then increases. A lower value 
of the dependent variable indicates better fiscal conditions. Therefore, the inverted U-
shaped correlation between the municipal structure index and government fiscal 
performance based on dependence on intergovernmental revenues is supported. Figure 2.2 
displays this correlation. 
Figure 2.2 Predicted percentage of intergovernmental transfers to total revenues with 
95% CI 
Results in column (7) indicate that the effects on governments’ debt level of both 
the municipal structure index and its square are negative and statistically significant. It 
implies that as the municipal structure becomes more administrative, governments’ debt 
level declines at an increasing rate. Lastly, results in column (8) in table 2.5 indicate that 
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the correlation between the municipal structure index and its square and governments’ 
general budget balance is not statistically significant. 
3.6.3 Moderating Effect of Municipal Structure 
The results of estimating model (3) are presented in table 2.6. In the multiplicative 
interaction model, effects of the factors of external environments on government fiscal 
conditions are contingent on the municipal structure. Similarly, interpreting the effect of 
municipal structure independently (for instance, the results reported in the first row in table 
2.6) is misleading. Therefore, primary attention is paid to the parameters of the interaction 
items to examine the moderating effect of municipal structure. Most of the interaction items, 
especially for the first two indicators of fiscal conditions, show statistically significant 
estimates at conventional levels. To save space, only the unemployment rate and TELs are 
used as examples to discuss. The former is an important indicator of local economic 
conditions and the latter is an essential fiscal constraint that can regulate governments’ 
fiscal behavior. 
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Table 2.6 Moderating effect of municipal structure (Model 3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cash 
solvency 
Intergov. 
revenue 
dependence 
Debt level General 
budget 
Surplus/deficit 
Municipal structure index -0.184 33.06*** -0.364 -10.60 
(0.720) (10.99) (0.912) (16.79) 
Socioeconomic factors 
Population size (log) 0.225*** -0.235 0.0738*** -0.358 
(0.0107) (0.152) (0.0188) (0.254) 
Population size × index -0.0725*** -0.779*** 0.0276 0.101 
(0.0123) (0.199) (0.0173) (0.281) 
Mean household income (log) 0.297*** 0.336 -0.161*** 2.078* 
(0.0408) (0.628) (0.0615) (1.099) 
Mean household income × index 0.00250 -1.647** -0.0163 0.821 
(0.0488) (0.816) (0.0596) (1.167) 
Unemployment rate -0.114*** 2.068*** -0.109** 0.761 
(0.0291) (0.408) (0.0496) (0.712) 
Unemployment rate × index 0.0687** -1.278*** 0.0373 0.726 
(0.0320) (0.476) (0.0442) (0.767) 
Fraction of residents over 65 0.272*** 0.381 -0.242*** -1.772** 
(0.0292) (0.374) (0.0428) (0.798) 
Fraction of residents over 65 × index -0.148*** -0.443 -0.0430 0.166 
(0.0386) (0.512) (0.0598) (1.085) 
Structure of local industries -1.373*** -3.531 0.0952 0.370 
(0.388) (5.379) (0.503) (8.059) 
Structure of local industries × index 1.216*** -12.09** 0.567 -3.191 
(0.401) (5.685) (0.553) (9.527) 
Fiscal factors 
Function in public health 0.0171 3.012*** -0.0270 3.267*** 
(0.0313) (0.456) (0.0415) (0.860) 
Function in public health × index 0.0750** 2.070*** 0.0216 -0.829 
(0.0333) (0.473) (0.0395) (0.879) 
Function in social service -0.174*** -4.465*** 0.249*** -0.716 
(0.0303) (0.447) (0.0412) (0.830) 
Function in social service × index -0.142*** 2.263*** 0.0202 0.840 
(0.0338) (0.486) (0.0447) (0.897) 
Function in public school 0.0933*** -0.224 0.0210 -2.062** 
(0.0311) (0.494) (0.0485) (0.823) 
Function in public school × index -0.0526 -5.465*** 0.133*** 0.509 
(0.0357) (0.597) (0.0507) (0.877) 
Structure of general revenues 0.873*** 14.23*** 0.824*** -8.931*** 
(0.106) (1.532) (0.182) (2.050) 
Structure of general revenues × index 0.243* 3.836** 0.0320 0.784 
(0.131) (1.920) (0.171) (2.192) 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
Structure of tax revenues -0.0810 -7.143*** -0.0417 1.734 
(0.0494) (0.733) (0.0775) (1.131) 
Structure of tax revenues × index 0.0299 -0.218 -0.243*** 0.430 
(0.0546) (0.879) (0.0743) (1.291) 
Institutional factors 
BBR -0.117*** -5.104*** -0.132*** -1.841*** 
(0.0285) (0.405) (0.0438) (0.632) 
BBR × index 0.0351 -0.916** 0.0292 -0.202 
(0.0305) (0.446) (0.0428) (0.716) 
Debt limit -0.132*** -2.589*** -0.0906** -0.303 
(0.0283) (0.445) (0.0441) (0.722) 
Debt limit × index -0.114*** 2.453*** -0.0869* 1.563* 
(0.0336) (0.557) (0.0477) (0.812) 
TELs stringency index 0.00603*** -0.164*** -0.00218 0.0332 
(0.00117) (0.0178) (0.00186) (0.0285) 
TELs stringency index × index -0.00400** 0.0561** -0.00363 0.00555 
(0.00161) (0.0260) (0.00227) (0.0373) 
2006 (2001 as reference) 0.444*** -2.400*** 0.143*** 1.174* 
(0.0266) (0.363) (0.0472) (0.669) 
2011 (2001 as reference) 0.677*** -2.305*** 0.287*** 1.197* 
(0.0281) (0.406) (0.0559) (0.657) 
Constant 1.246** 16.49* 2.407*** -10.08 
(0.633) (9.084) (0.893) (15.23) 
Observations 6,758 6,750 6,579 6,785 
R-squared 0.214 0.154 0.030 0.016 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating model (3). Refer to table 2.4 for the 
measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Results in table 2.6 show that the unemployment rate is negatively and statistically 
significantly correlated with government fiscal conditions for the first two indicators. The 
signs of the estimated coefficients of the interaction item between the unemployment rate 
and the municipal structure political-administrative index show that as the municipal 
structure becomes more administrative, the negative correlation between the 
unemployment rate and government fiscal conditions is moderated. A potential explanation 
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is that, as the nature of municipal structure becomes more administrative, increasing 
managerial professionalism and efficiency as well as adoption of prospecting in strategy 
stance help government officials effectively mitigate the negative effect of external 
economic difficulties on government fiscal conditions. 
Results in table 2.6 show that the more stringent fiscal constraints by TELs help 
governments improve fiscal conditions for the first two indicators. Based on the 
coefficients of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and TELs 
stringency index, as the municipal structure becomes more administrative, the positive 
correlation between the TELs stringency index and government fiscal conditions is 
moderated. One potential explanation is that a higher level of professional autonomy helps 
government officials adeptly circumvent the fiscal constraints by TELs. 
3.6.4 Solving the Endogeneity Problem Using IVs 
Structural characteristics may be endogenously adopted in municipalities, which 
will lead to biased estimates of the effect of municipal structure. The endogeneity problem 
may result from the unobservable or unmeasurable confounder in the error term in 
estimation models or the reverse causality between municipal structure and governments’ 
fiscal conditions. 
There may be unobservable or unmeasurable factors existing in the error term that 
can simultaneously determine the municipal structure and affect government fiscal 
conditions. These factors can presumably involve the political preferences of local citizens 
and cultural and historical features of municipalities. It is also reasonable to assume that 
municipalities may appoint a CAO or change other structural characteristics because of 
poor fiscal performance. 
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One means to cope with the endogeneity problem is to utilize instrumental variables 
(IVs) for municipal structure. Appropriate instrumental variables must be strongly 
correlated with municipal structure and independent of the error term in the fiscal condition 
determinants model (Arellano and Bover 1995). Selection of instrumental variables is 
based on existing evidence on the determinants of municipal structure. Nelson (2011) finds 
that states’ statutory or constitutional provisions on municipal governments’ autonomy of 
institutional changes influence local choices of municipal form or structural characteristics. 
Similarly, Marando and Reeves (1993) find that states’ constitutional or legislative 
decisions to allow for structural changes in local governments substantially affect the 
structural reforms of county governments. 
This article uses existence of the initiative and popular referendum that allow 
citizens to place changes of the charter, ordinance, and home rule on the ballot as IVs for 
municipal structure. Data on the initiative and popular referendum in municipalities are 
derived from the Municipal Form of Government surveys by ICMA. As a matter of fact, 
according to the survey results, many structural changes are made through local charters, 
resolutions, or ordinances. There is no sufficient or convincing evidence demonstrating 
that citizens’ autonomy to change the charter and ordinance through initiative and popular 
referendum has independent effects on indicators of government fiscal conditions. 
The results of using IVs for the municipal structure political-administrative index 
and utilizing the Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLS) to regress model (1) are reported in table 
2.7. The two IVs perform remarkably well from the statistical perspective. The Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic from the weak identification test shows that the “weak instruments” 
hypothesis is statistically significantly rejected in all the four regressions. The Hansen J-
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statistic from the over-identification restriction test suggests that the hypothesis of no 
correlation between the IVs and the error term in the model of interest cannot be 
statistically significantly rejected. 
The coefficients of the municipal structure index are statistically significant in the 
first three columns, and the signs of coefficients indicate that the administrative municipal 
structure has a positive effect on government fiscal conditions for the first three indicators. 
Compared to the results shown in columns (1) and (2) in table 2.5, signs of the coefficients 
of the municipal structure index remain unchanged, but the magnitudes of effects are much 
larger. The effect of municipal structure on debt level reported in column (3) in table 2.5 
is not statistically significant, but it becomes statistically significant in column (3) in table 
2.7 when using IVs to solve the endogeneity problem. The results imply that the positive 
effect of the administrative municipal structure on government fiscal conditions is 
underestimated in the original estimation due to the endogeneity problem. 
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Table 2.7 Effect of municipal structure using IVs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Cash 
solvency 
Intergov. 
revenue 
dependence 
Debt level General 
budget 
Surplus/deficit 
Municipal structure index 0.491*** -6.931*** -0.494** 1.706 
(0.139) (2.043) (0.247) (3.017) 
Socioeconomic factors 
Population size (log) 0.238*** -0.143 0.0419* -0.568** 
(0.0130) (0.181) (0.0254) (0.276) 
Mean household income 0.106* 1.916* -0.0388 1.940 
(0.0635) (1.020) (0.0966) (1.403) 
Unemployment rate -0.152*** 2.505*** -0.115** 0.649 
(0.0329) (0.491) (0.0574) (0.756) 
Fraction of residents over 65 0.256*** -0.0535 -0.291*** -1.880** 
(0.0327) (0.428) (0.0485) (0.846) 
Structure of local industries -1.335*** 1.175 0.307 2.494 
(0.469) (5.969) (0.581) (8.553) 
Fiscal factors 
Function in public health 0.197*** -0.261 -0.215** 3.783*** 
(0.0628) (0.886) (0.104) (1.400) 
Function in social service -0.211*** -4.969*** 0.227*** -0.334 
(0.0341) (0.488) (0.0456) (0.838) 
Function in public school 0.0510 2.598*** 0.118* -2.363*** 
(0.0352) (0.577) (0.0608) (0.834) 
Structure of general revenues 0.739*** 14.28*** 0.905*** -8.294*** 
(0.122) (1.762) (0.201) (2.096) 
Structure of tax revenues -0.306*** -4.993*** 0.255* 0.861 
(0.0784) (1.074) (0.147) (1.594) 
Institutional factors 
BBR -0.354*** -1.082 0.152 -2.966* 
(0.0792) (1.153) (0.127) (1.647) 
Debt limit -0.220*** -1.089** -0.0655 -0.456 
(0.0336) (0.485) (0.0517) (0.797) 
TELs stringency index -0.00241 -0.0358 0.00655 -0.0117 
(0.00271) (0.0397) (0.00490) (0.0585) 
2006 (2001 as reference) -0.640*** 2.180*** -0.308*** -0.815 
(0.0320) (0.471) (0.0622) (0.714) 
2011 (2001 as reference) -0.222*** -0.0997 -0.160*** 0.441 
(0.0302) (0.429) (0.0475) (0.707) 
Constant 4.568*** -15.45 1.030 -5.554 
(0.959) (14.33) (1.361) (19.38) 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic) 39.1 40.1 39.3 40.3 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Over-identification test 
(Hansen J-statistic) 
2.67 
(p=0.102) 
1.69 
(p=0.193) 
0.210 
(p=0.647) 
0.265 
(p=0.607) 
Observations 5,853 5,844 5,690 5,875 
Notes: Results are obtained by estimating model (1), using existence of the initiative 
and popular referendum that allow citizens to place changes of the charter, ordinance, and 
home rule on the ballot as IVs for the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
Refer to table 2.4 for the measurements and descriptive statistics of variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Evidence from this article has implications for the effect of municipal structure and 
the determinants of local government fiscal conditions. Previous empirical studies usually 
adopt a dichotomous classification of municipal form as the mayor-council or council-
manager. However, prevalent cross-adoption of structural characteristics makes the 
boundary between the nominal forms ambiguous. Absorbing the merits of typologies used 
by previous studies to reclassify municipal structure, this article constructs a municipal 
structure political-administrative index by investigating structural characteristics 
pertaining to managerial professionalism, separation of powers, and local electoral systems. 
The index measures the political or administrative nature of municipal structure. The 
former underscores separation of powers and checks and balances between the mayor and 
council members, direct responsiveness and accountability of the mayor to voters, and 
influence of parties and special interests on local elections; and the latter highlights 
managerial professionalism, concentration of powers in the council, and elimination of 
partisan and special interests’ influence on elections. 
Municipal structure is correlated with government internal management through a 
variety of mechanisms. The administrative municipal structure promotes managerial 
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professionalism and efficiency and stimulates officials to act as prospectors in the choice 
of managerial strategy stance. These effects lead to a positive correlation between the 
municipal structure political-administrative index and government fiscal performance. On 
the other hand, considering the public nature of governments, officials’ accountability to 
the public and prompt reacting to the dynamic demands of voters are also important for 
improving government performance. This study accordingly hypothesizes that the 
municipal structure that mixes the political and administrative characteristics may result in 
better fiscal conditions, which implies an inverted U-shaped relationship between the 
municipal structure index and indicators of government fiscal conditions. In addition, 
municipal structure can moderate effects of the factors of external environments on 
government fiscal performance. The empirical evidence supports the proposed hypotheses 
for the fiscal conditions of governments in cash solvency, dependence on 
intergovernmental transfers, and debt level. The evidence becomes stronger when using 
instrumental variables to solve the endogeneity problem of municipal structure. 
This research practices the approaches suggested by Carr (2015) to advance research 
on the effect of municipal structure on government performance. A potential limitation is 
that the correlations between municipal structure and officials’ strategy stance choices and 
managerial accountability and efficiency is based on theoretical inference. Therefore, 
further studies that produce empirical evidence to support the correlations are encouraged. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL SLACK: EVIDENCE 
FROM A POLITICAL-BUDGETARY-MANAGERIAL FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction 
Classic public finance theories hold that counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policies 
are exclusive domains of the national government (Musgrave 1959). Contrary to this 
conventional wisdom, the seminal work of Gramlich (1987) contends that subnational 
governments play an important counter-cyclical role in stabilizing the budget (Hou and 
Moynihan 2007; Wang and Hou 2012). State governments can save fiscal slack, which is 
commonly called a “rainy” day fund or budget stabilization fund, in economic booms to 
have resources to spend during downturn periods, thus influencing governmental savings 
and budgetary stabilization (Hou 2006; Hou and Brewer 2010; Knight and Levinson 1999; 
Rose 2008; Wagner 2003; Wei and Denison 2019). 
The rationale of fiscal slack and budgetary stabilization is also applicable to the local 
government (Tyer 1993; Wolkoff 1987). Compared to the state, local government has a 
lower degree of fiscal autonomy amid fiscal constraints by the state and is more dependent 
on intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, the external fiscal environments of local 
government changed dramatically in recent decades (Chapman 2008), rendering them 
more reliant on the pro-cyclical and income-elastic local sales taxes and program charges 
and fees. The increasing fiscal vulnerability and volatility makes budgetary stabilization a 
salient challenge of local government fiscal management. 
Research on local government fiscal slack has substantial implications for 
practitioners and academics in the field of public administration and management. 
Accumulation and usage of fiscal slack is relevant to the effective and efficient 
management of government fiscal resources, which are the basis on which public services 
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are provided, government functions are realized, and government performance is measured 
and evaluated (Jimenez 2017). Also, management of local government fiscal slack pertains 
to budgetary transparency on the grounds that local government usually uses an informal 
form of fiscal slack, such as the year-end general fund balances, which are less regulated 
by legislation and institutional rules compared to the state budget stabilization funds (Rose 
and Smith 2012; Stewart et al.2015). Moreover, local government usually maintains 
massive general fund balances as fiscal slack, which is vastly beyond the 5-15 percent of 
operating budget recommended by credit rating agencies and professional organizations 
(Gore 2009; Marlowe 2005). Research on local government fiscal slack sheds light on the 
motivations and consequences of government’s saving behavior. 
This research specifically focuses on the determinants of local government fiscal 
slack balance. Scholars have recently advanced studies in this research area (Gianakis and 
Snow 2007; Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017; Hendrick 2006; Snow, Gianakis, and 
Haughton 2015; Wang and Hou 2012); however, the existing evidence is mixed or 
inconclusive. This article contributes evidence for the related literature through examining 
the determinants of local government’s fiscal slack in a three-dimensional framework 
comprised by voters’ political preferences, government’s budgetary performance, and 
government internal management. The essential argument is that factors of each dimension 
work interactively to affect government fiscal slack, instead of exerting influence 
independently. 
The next section of this article introduces the related literature and discusses the 
limitations. Section three constructs the theoretical framework of government fiscal slack 
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and proposes three testable hypotheses. Section four introduces the research methodology, 
followed by the empirical results in Section five. The last section concludes and discusses. 
4.2 Related Literature 
4.2.1 Determinants of Local Government Fiscal Slack 
Prior research on the determinants of local government fiscal slack involves 
perspectives from multiple disciplines. Organizational slack is first studied by 
organizational scientists in such classic works as Cyert and March (1963) and Thompson 
(1967). These scholars hold that organizational slack can serve as the inducement to 
maintain a coalition of interest groups inside the organization, resources for conflict 
resolution, buffer of workflow, and facilitators of strategic behavior of organization 
managers (Bourgeois 1981). Therefore, the organizations that face fierce internal conflicts, 
that are exposed to external uncertainties, and whose “core technology” is vulnerable to 
external competition should maintain a high level of slack resources (Bourgeois 1981; 
Nohria and Gulati 1997; Sharfman et al. 1988). In the field of government fiscal 
management, scholars have found that local governments whose revenues are more volatile 
or uncertain are prone to save more fiscal slack (Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017); however, 
there is insufficient evidence on the effects of other organizational factors. 
From the perspective of political responsiveness or accountability, voters can 
substantially influence local government’s fiscal policy making by expressing their 
preferences on the ballot. Although preferences of various groups regarding governmental 
saving and spending policies may bifurcate, adhering to the preference of the median voter 
is the optimal political strategy by politicians who want to be re-elected (Downs 1957). 
The Tiebout (1956) theorem also implies that mobile residents can choose their living 
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communities based on their preferences for tax and expenditure policies, resulting in 
relatively unified preferences or sentiment of voters in a community. Snow, Gianakis, and 
Haughton (2015) find that voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment has a negative effect 
on the balance of Massachusetts municipalities’ stabilization funds. 
Managerial factors inside the government can also enormously affect government 
fiscal slack. Hendrick (2006) argues that the managerial capacity and professional 
management of local government may be more important than other political and 
socioeconomic factors in determining government’s fiscal behavior. Hendrick (2006) finds 
that professional management in Chicago’s suburban municipalities helps increase their 
unreserved general fund balances. Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) point out that 
sophisticated expertise, professional training, managerial experiences, and commitment to 
professionalism are necessary components of professional financial management. They 
find a positive correlation between government’s financial management capacity and the 
balance of Massachusetts municipalities’ stabilization funds. 
Demographic, economic, and financial factors can affect local government fiscal 
slack from the supply and demand side. Groups with different demographic characteristics 
have various demands for public goods and services in both quantity and quality, thus 
influencing government expenditures and savings (Marlowe 2011). Outstanding economic 
performance and healthy financial conditions create the ultimate revenue base for 
government to save (Guo and Wang 2017; Stewart 2009; Wang and Hou 2012). All prior 
studies on local government fiscal slack control in research models for demographic, 
economic, and financial factors, such as government revenues and expenditures (Wang and 
Hou 2012), outstanding debt and debt service (Gore 2009), population size and growth 
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(Gore 2009; Guo and Wang 2017), and the unemployment rate (Stewart 2009), among 
others. 
4.2.2 Limitations in Previous Studies 
An important limitation of previous studies is the lack of integration of various 
theoretical perspectives into a comprehensive framework and the consequent failure to 
probe into the interactive effects of multiple factors on government fiscal slack in empirical 
investigations. Government fiscal management outputs are the products of an interactive 
process between the external environments and internal government management. 
However, most previous studies do not take into account the interaction effects, and they 
implicitly assume that all factors exert their influence on government fiscal slack balance 
independently. 
Inferences based on various theoretical perspectives may result in contradictory 
conclusions. For instance, organizational theories suggest that government mired in 
declining economic and fiscal conditions are confronted with an unstable external 
environment and, therefore, should maintain more fiscal slack for coping with potential 
crises. Nevertheless, from the perspectives of economics and fiscal management, 
deteriorating economic and fiscal conditions damage the revenue base and render 
government incapable of saving much fiscal slack. As another example, scholars and 
practitioners may predict that government amid voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending 
sentiment will exhaust most surpluses, even with outstanding economic performance and 
healthy fiscal conditions. However, professioanl management inside government may 
counteract the influence of voters’ sentiment on government fiscal policy making.  
Therefore, failure to analyze government fiscal slack in a comprehensive multiple-
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dimensional framework may result in an unclear or misleading conclusion with regard to 
what factors motivating government to save. 
Another limitation of previous studies is the scarce attention paid to the essential 
role government internal management plays in determining government fiscal slack 
balance, as well as the effect of its interaction with the external socioeconomic and political 
environments. Inputs from the external environment are processed by internal 
management of policy makers to produce policy outputs. Government internal 
management can hardly exert direct control over the external environment, but it can 
influence the external environment to a large extent through strategic policy choices. For 
instance, government officials can utilize tax credits to attract private investment, thus 
enhancing local economic vigor. Government internal management can also affect local 
government fiscal behavior by adjusting managerial practices. For instance, the elected 
political leader can promote government fiscal management in a professional manner by 
appointing an experienced fiscal manager who is responsible for budgetary and fiscal 
affairs and by adopting advanced fiscal management techniques and procedures. 
4.3 A Theoretical Framework of Government Fiscal Slack 
This article constructs a three-dimensional framework to analyze the determinants of 
local government fiscal slack balance by addressing (1) the political preferences or 
sentiment of voters, (2) the budgetary performance of government, and (3) government 
internal management. This research proposes one appropriate indicator for each of the 
dimensions, and the hypotheses are introduced accordingly. 
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4.3.1 Voters’ Political Preferences 
In the classic principal-agent model, government officials as the agent must defer 
to the demands and preferences of voters who act as the principal in public policy making 
(Waterman and Meier 1998). The officials who defy the preferences or sentiment of voters 
will be voted out in elections. Budgetary savings may trigger political pressure among the 
anti-tax groups who view the unspent fiscal slack as unnecessary tax levies and the pro-
spending groups who view fiscal slack as forgone spending (Rose and Smith 2012; Snow, 
Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). Therefore, government in the midst of voters’ anti-tax or 
pro-spending sentiment is less likely to accumulate much fiscal slack. In contrast, in 
communities where voters are risk-averse and fiscally prudent, government is motivated to 
save more. 
It is always a challenge to operationalize the elusive preference or sentiment of 
voters in empirical studies, especially as the available tool of measurement is limited to 
secondary administrative data. This research employs and adjusts the method of Snow, 
Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) to measure the anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment of 
voters. Anti-tax sentiment makes government hesitate to levy an excessive level of tax, 
which is manifested in the tax revolt since California’s Proposition 13 in 1978. Snow, 
Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) argue that voters’ political sentiment remains stable for a 
fairly long time. Therefore, they measure voters’ anti-tax sentiment in Massachusetts 
municipalities by averaging the percentage of voters who are in favor to “limit the growth 
of taxes, reduce tax rates, change tax structures, or repeal them outright” in “eight statewide 
tax measures appeared on general election ballots in Massachusetts” between 1980 and 
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2010 (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015: 306).15 The authors assume that voters’ anti-
tax sentiment does not change over decades and use the anti-tax sentiment as a time-
invariant variable in empirical research. Appendix 1 presents the eight statewide tax 
limitation ballot questions and the vote results. All the five proposed tax limitations before 
2000 were successfully enacted, but the three after 2000 failed. 
Figure 3.1 displays the box plot of the percentages of voters in Massachusetts 
municipalities who are in favor of tax limitations for each of the eight ballot questions. 
Although the tax limitation measures are different, the fundamental assumption here is that 
the vote results can reflect voters’ attitudes or sentiment towards taxation at a certain time 
in a similar way. Figure 3.1 shows that voters’ anti-tax sentiment is dynamic across time. 
It presents a trend of increasing in most time of the 1980s and 1990s and decreasing in the 
2000s, and it displays a hint of increasing after 2008. Therefore, this research does not treat 
voters’ anti-tax sentiment as time-invariant. This research uses the percentage of voters in 
each municipality who are in favor of tax limitation on each of the eight ballots as the 
indicator of anti-tax sentiment for the municipality in the ballot year. The missing values 
in the interval (non-ballot) years are interpolated by averaging the percentages for the most 
recent ballot question before and after the interval year weighted by the time distance.16 
15 Refer to Wallin (2004) for more details pertaining to the tax limitation measures on general election ballots 
in Massachusetts. 
16 For instance, the missing value in 2003 is interpolated by averaging the values in 2002 and 2008, weighting 
the value in 2002 by 5/6 and the value in 2008 by 1/6. The missing value in 2004 is interpolated by averaging 
the values in 2002 and 2008, weighting the value in 2002 by 4/6 and the value in 2008 by 2/6. The last tax 
limitation measure was proposed in 2010 in the dataset. This research interpolates the anti-tax sentiment in 
2011 by directly substituting into the value in 2010. 
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Figure 3.1 Box plot of the percentages of voters in Massachusetts municipalities favoring 
tax limitations in eight statewide ballot questions for 1980-2010 
The pro-spending sentiment is measured by the action of voters’ override of the 
state-imposed property tax limit (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015). The research 
sample is municipalities in Massachusetts. In 1980, Massachusetts’ voters in a statewide 
referendum initiated and passed Proposition 2½ to limit the levy amount and growth rate 
of property tax in all municipalities. Meanwhile, the state constitution empowers municipal 
governments to override the property tax limit and increase the quota of property tax levy 
amount if government officials propose an override on the ballot and local voters approve 
it in a referendum. If a property tax limit override is successfully passed in a municipality, 
the government is able to increase property tax levy and spend more. Snow, Gianakis, and 
Haughton (2015) use a binary variable to indicate the successful property tax limit override 
as the measure of voters’ pro-spending sentiment. However, Massachusetts municipalities 
may propose multiple property tax limit overrides on multiple ballots in one single year or 
propose multiple overrides on one ballot (this is called the “measure” approach). Therefore, 
one successful override among multiple attempts may reflect a different degree of voters’ 
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pro-spending sentiment compared to one success out of one single attempt. This research 
adjusts the method of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) by using the percentage of the 
successful property tax limit override amounts among the proposed override amounts as a 
continuous measure of voters’ pro-spending sentiment in a certain year. If no override 
attempts occur in a given municipality-year observation, a value 0 is assigned. 
Hypothesis 1: Voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending preferences are 
negatively correlated with the balance of government fiscal slack, all else 
being equal. 
4.3.2 Budgetary Performance 
The second important dimension in the framework of government fiscal slack 
analysis is government’s budgetary performance, which is defined as a concept that can 
comprehensively reflect the situation of budgetary operation of government in the long-
term. This article uses the method of Hou (2003) and Wei and Denison (2019) to calculate 
the budgetary gap, that is, the difference between the actual operating budget and the 
expected trend of operating budget in the long-term, as a measure of government’s 
budgetary performance. The budgetary gap can be positive or negative. A positive 
budgetary gap means that the operating budget in a certain year stands above the long-term 
expected trend, and the contrary for the negative budgetary gap. Specially, the budgetary 
gap is expressed as follows. 
𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗       (1).
𝐵𝑖𝑡 indicates the actual per capita operating budget in municipality 𝑖 in year t, and 
𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗  refers to the expected trend value. 𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗  is obtained “using a time trend ordinary least
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squares (OLS) regression model” (Wei and Denison 2019: 11), which can be expressed as 
follows. 
𝐵𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑇𝑡      (2).
𝛼𝑖  is the constant for municipality 𝑖, 𝛽𝑖  is the estimated parameter for the given 
municipality, and 𝑇𝑡 is the coded time value. Based on the available data in the analysis, 
this research calculates the expected trend of per capita operating budget for 25 years 
(1991-2015). 
Accurate forecasting of government revenues, expenditures and operating budget 
is a substantial challenge confronted by both practitioners and scholars of government 
financial management (Mikesell 2018). Numerous technical and structural difficulties 
hinder government financial managers from minimizing the volatility of government 
revenues and expenditures and maintaining a long-term smooth operating budget. 
Whatever the reasons are, intuitively, a positive budgetary gap, which happens when the 
actual per capita operating budget exceeds the expected trend, presumably manifests 
affluent revenues and sound fiscal conditions. Therefore, government with a positive 
(negative) budgetary gap is more likely to save more (less) fiscal slack. In another line of 
reasoning, fiscal slack is usually saved in economically and fiscally sound times to spend 
during downturn periods (Hou and Brewer 2010; Hou and Moynihan 2007). Although a 
positive budgetary gap does noes necessarily result in budgetary surpluses, government 
with an operating budget exceeding the expected trend level is more likely to save fiscal 
slack. 
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Hypothesis 2: Government’s budgetary performance, which is 
measured by the budgetary gap, is positively correlated with the balance of 
government fiscal slack, all else being equal. 
4.3.3 Government Internal Management 
Scholars of public management generally hold that management matters for 
government performance (Boyne 2003; Meier and O'Toole 2002; Moynihan and Pandey 
2004; Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole 2004; O'Toole and Meier 1999, 2003). However, 
comprehensively and accurately operationalizing the managerial factors inside government 
in empirical studies on the management-performance linkage is a challenge for scholars 
(Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003). Government management is an abstract concept 
which can be examined from the perspectives of managerial structure and managerial 
practice (Justice and Scorsone 2013). The former primarily focuses on the structural and 
institutional settings based on which government officials enact and implement public 
policies and operate the government (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004; Wei, Butler, 
and Jennings 2019), while the latter specifically examines the practical or technical aspects 
of government internal management, such as who takes charge of a certain government 
function, how public policies are enacted and what the procedures are in implementing the 
policies. 
Prior studies usually employ indicators that can partly reflect the quality or practice 
of government internal management (Meier and O'Toole 2002; O'Toole and Meier 2003). 
However, as noted by Nicholson-Crotty and O'Toole (2004), it is infeasible to measure all 
forms of managerial efforts in public organizations. To operationalize government internal 
management in a feasible manner and considering data availability in measurement, this 
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article focuses on the government structure of municipalities in Massachusetts as an 
appropriate indicator of government internal management by classifying the municipal 
structure on a political-administrative dimension using the method of Wei, Butler, and 
Jennings (2019). Under different municipal structures, the political officials and 
professional bureaucrats are elected or appointed in different methods and they have 
various responsibilities, motivations, and behavior in government internal management 
(Demir and Reddick 2012), resulting in different combinations of management efficiency 
and accountability (Wei, Butler, and Jennings 2019; Zhang 2014; Zhang and Feiock 2009). 
Similarly, the political market framework of Lubell et al. (2009) argues that the institutional 
structure “determines the balance of administrative and electoral power in any given city.” 
(Lubell et al. 2009: 653). 
The conventional wisdom that separates the primary municipal structure into the 
mayor-council or council-manager is problematic because the prevalent cross-adoption of 
structural characteristics between different municipal structures makes the structure 
boundaries ambiguous (Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 2004; Lubell et al. 2009; Wei, 
Butler, and Jennings 2019).17 Scholars have proposed various approaches to reclassify the 
municipal structure (Carr and Karuppusamy 2008, 2009; Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood 
2004; Wei, Butler, and Jennings 2019).18 This study applies the method of Wei, Butler, and 
Jennings (2019) by focusing on six fundamental structural characteristics, coding the 
17 There are five statutory forms of municipal structure in the U.S. municipalities: mayor-council, council-
manager, commission, town meeting, and representative town meeting. The basic characteristics of these 
forms can be found on the website of the National League of Cities at http://www.nlc.org/forms-of-
municipal-government. 
18 Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) in their study introduce the prior efforts to reclassify municipal structure 
in detail and discuss the merits and limitations of various approaches of reclassification. Also, the authors 
propose the method of classifying municipal structure on a political-administrative dimension. 
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structural characteristics based on their political or administrative nature, and using factor 
analysis to construct a municipal structure political-administrative index. The “approach 
of constructing an index to reclassify municipal structures on a political-administrative 
dimension has the merit of comprehensively evaluating the political or administrative 
nature of municipal structures by investigating more structural characteristics.” (Wei, 
Butler, and Jennings 2019: 192). 
The standards for constructing the municipal structure index are presented in table 
3.1. For each of the six structural characteristics, a value 0, 0.5, or 1 is assigned based on 
their political or professional nature.19 This research constructs the municipal structure 
political-professional index by predicting the principal factor after factor analysis of the six 
coded values. The factor analysis reports only one eigenvalue above one, which is 3.11, 
and the second largest eigenvalue is 0.11. Appendix 2 reports the factor loadings of 
components for the obtained principal factor, which is positively and heavily loaded by the 
first five structural characteristics. The principal factor is used as the municipal structure 
index, and it ranges between -2 and 0.57 in the research sample, with mean 0.04 and 
standard deviation 0.94. A lower index indicates a more political municipal structure and 
a higher index indicates a more administrative or professional municipal structure. 
19 Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) have discussed the political or administrative nature of each structural 
characteristic in detail. Readers who are interested in the method of municipal structure classification can 
refer to their study. 
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Table 3.1 Standards for constructing the municipal structure political-professional index 
Standards\Coded values 0 0.5 1 
Does a chief administrative officer (CAO) exist? No Yes 
How is the government head elected? Direct election Non-direct election 
Is the government head independent of council (board)? Yes No 
Does the government head have authority to veto council (board)? Yes No 
Is the election of council (board) members partisan or nonpartisan? Partisan Nonpartisan 
Is the election of council (board) members at-large or by-district? By-district Combination At-large 
Notes: The method of constructing the municipal structure political-administrative index is borrowed from Wei, Butler, and 
Jennings (2019). Refer to table 1 of their research for comparison. Note that this article deletes one structural characteristic here (the 
statutory form as mayor-council or council-manager) on the grounds many Massachusetts municipalities among the research sample use 
the town meeting or representative town meeting form but Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) only involve the mayor-council and council-
manager municipalities in their study.
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Wei, Butler, and Jennings (2019) have discussed the validity and reliability of the 
municipal structure political-professional index in detail. This research here only briefly 
introduces some results from the related statistical tests. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients show that almost each pair of the six index components (namely, the coded 
values of the structural characteristics) is statistically significantly correlated at the 0.001 
level. This research then uses the Cronbach’s alpha to test the internal scale reliability and 
consistency of the index components. The alpha value 0.82 indicates that the six index 
components are closely related to be measurements of a single concept. Further, the fact 
that only one eigenvalue value after the factor analysis is above the threshold value one 
demonstrates the unidimensional nature of the six index components. 
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate how government internal 
management can interact with the factors of voters’ preferences and government’s 
budgetary performance to influence government fiscal slack balance. Government internal 
management under the more political structure underscores officials’ political leadership 
and direct responsiveness and accountability to voters, as well as the influence of partisan 
politics on policy making. In contrast, government internal management under the more 
administrative or professional structure stresses the effective and efficient management by 
professional managers who possess managerial experience and expertise and the 
elimination of partisan influence on local affairs. Therefore, government officials under the 
municipal structure with more administrative or professional nature can more easily 
moderate the influence of voters’ preferences and the pressure from economic and 
budgetary performance in fiscal policy making by taking advantages of professional 
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expertise and skills. This research accordingly proposes the third testable hypothesis as 
follows. 
Hypothesis 3: Government internal management, which is 
operationalized by the municipal structure political-administrative index, 
modifies the negative effect of voters’ anti-tax and pro-spending 
preferences and the positive effect of the budgetary gap on the balance of 
government fiscal slack, all else being equal. 
4.4 Methodology 
This study uses Massachusetts municipalities as the sample for empirical analysis. 
Although focusing on municipalities from one state has a limitation in external 
generalizability, it mitigates the problem of inconsistence in the measurement of local 
government’s fiscal slack across states. It also has the advantage of having a consistent set 
of state rules that apply to the municipalities. Almost all Massachusetts municipalities have 
adopted stabilization funds as the main form of fiscal slack (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 
2015). Moreover, the rich data resources provided by the Division of Local Services (DLS) 
of Massachusetts Department of Revenue facilitate the empirical investigation. 
4.4.1 Model Specification 
This research first uses the OLS regression model with fixed effects to examine the 
direct effects of the variables of interest depicted in the previous section on government 
fiscal slack. Although the primary purpose of this study is to investigate the determinants 
of government fiscal slack in an interactive framework, this effort corresponds to the 
endeavors of previous studies and serves as the basis of comparison to the results from the 
multiplicative interaction regression model. The first model is specified as follows. 
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𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3). 
This research then employs the multiplicative interaction regression model with 
fixed effects to test the modifying effect of government internal management on the effects 
of voters’ preferences and government’s budgetary performance on government fiscal 
slack. All constitutive terms of the interaction items should be included in the 
multiplicative interaction model (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).20 The second model 
is specified as follows. 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑖𝑡 × 𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 
+𝛽6𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡       (4) 
𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the fiscal slack balance of municipality i in year t. This study uses the per 
capita stabilization fund balance as the measure of the amount of government fiscal slack 
in Massachusetts municipalities. 𝑃𝑖𝑡 refers to voters’ preferences, measured by the anti-tax 
and pro-spending sentiment. 𝐵𝑖𝑡  indicates the budgetary performance of government, 
which is measured by the budgetary gap. Lastly, 𝑀𝑖𝑡  denotes municipal government’s 
internal management, indicated by the municipal structure political-administrative index. 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of control variables, which will be described below. Municipality 
fixed effects are 𝜃𝑖 (in equation 3) and 𝛿𝑖 (in equation 4) that control for the effects of the 
time-invariant, unobserved characteristics of municipalities. Time fixed effects are 𝜆𝑡 (in 
equation 3) and 𝛾𝑡 (in equation 4), which control for the environmental variations along 
with time that are common to all municipalities. The estimated parameters are 𝛼 and 𝛽, 
and 𝜀 and µ are the disturbance terms. 
20 Refer to Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2005) for details about the multiplicative interaction regression 
model and the interpretation of regression results. 
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4.4.2 Data Collection 
The units of analysis are municipality-year observations in Massachusetts. Data are 
derived from two sources. Data on fiscal slack (stabilization funds), operating budget, 
demographic characteristics and fiscal indicators are collected from the DLS of 
Massachusetts Department of Revenue.21 This research collects the data on the structural 
characteristics of Massachusetts municipalities from the Municipal Form of Government 
surveys implemented by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 
in 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011.22 The ICMA mails survey questions to clerks of all 
municipalities with population size above 2,500 and to selected ones with population size 
below 2,500. The five surveys used in this study have response rates around 50%. These 
surveys are by far the most comprehensive resources about municipalities’ structural 
characteristics, and they have been widely used in previous studies (Carr and Karuppusamy 
2008, 2009; Coate and Knight 2011; Lubell et al. 2009). 
This research focuses on municipalities in Massachusetts; therefore, only the 
respondents from Massachusetts are involved in analysis. The surveys are implemented 
every five years, with missing data in the interval years. Each survey includes questions 
about structural characteristics in various aspects (e.g., Does your municipality have the 
position of chief administrative officer? How is your government head elected?). Also, 
there is a question that asks whether there have been any attempts to change the structural 
characteristics since the previous survey. If the answer is “yes”, the respondent is asked to 
21 The data are accessible at https://www.mass.gov/municipal-databank-data-analytics. 
22 The ICMA implements the Municipal Form of Government survey every five years. The survey in 2011 
is the most recent one that is available on the ICMA’s official website when this study is conducted. 
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pinpoint which structural changes have been made and whether and when the changes have 
been approved. 
Some fundamental assumptions are made to interpolate the missing survey data in 
the interval (non-survey) years. If the survey results show that a municipality has the same 
structural characteristics in two consecutive surveys and the respondent answers “no” to 
the question in the latter survey that asks whether the municipality has adjusted structural 
characteristics since the previous survey, this study assumes that the municipality’s 
structural characteristics remain consistent in the interval years between the two 
consecutive surveys. The missing data of the interval years are filled in accordingly. If the 
survey results show that a municipality has different structural characteristics in two 
consecutive surveys and the respondent answers “yes” to the question in the latter survey 
that asks whether the municipality has adjusted structural characteristics since the previous 
survey, this study fills in the missing data in the interval years by referring to the answer 
to the question that asks when the adjustments are approved and effective. If a municipality 
does not reply to two surveys consecutively, the missing data in the interval years cannot 
be interpolated. After merging datasets from the DLS and ICMA’s surveys and deleting 
the observations with missing data, this study obtains an unbalanced panel of 1,306 
municipality-year observations for 1993-2011. 
4.4.3 Control Variables 
Table 3.2 reports the names, measures, and descriptive statistics of all variables. 
The three explanatory variables of interest have been introduced in the previous section. 
This article next briefly discusses effects of the control variables (𝑋𝑖𝑡  in the regression 
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models). Selection of the control variables is based on findings from previous studies and 
data availability. 
97 
Table 3.2 Variable names, measures, and descriptive statistics 
Variable Measure Mean S. D. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
Fiscal slack size Log of per capita stabilization fund balances 93.95 93.91 0.00 596.17 
Explanatory variables of interest 
Municipal structure index Refer to the introduction in manuscript 0.04 0.94 -2.00 0.57 
Pro-spending sentiment Refer to the introduction in manuscript 7.76 26.07 0 100 
Anti-tax sentiment Refer to the introduction in manuscript 55.55 18.22 12.91 90.56 
Budgetary performance Per capita budgetary gap -7.51 464.55 -4154.92 3519.59 
Control variables 
Population size 23041.66 21524.24 1496 166761 
Population growth rate % 0.59 2.38 -49.18 21.39 
Unemployment rate % 4.62 2.25 0.90 27.50 
Total assessed value of properties per capita 132288.70 84530.13 36218.80 860985.60 
State aid State aid as percentage of total revenues (%) 18.32 12.35 0.82 60.57 
Revenue diversity Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 0.74 0.12 0.34 0.96 
Excess tax capacity Per capita 40.71 87.56 0 966.49 
Free cash Per capita 128.10 125.73 -137.71 943.78 
Overlay reserve Per capita 28.31 15.30 5.93 128.58 
Debt level Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%) 58.36 36.15 0 232.70 
Government creditworthiness Credit ratings from Moody’s 
(5=Aaa, 4=Aa, 3=A, 2=Baa, and 1=Ba) 
3.37 0.72 1 5 
Notes: The number of municipality-year observations in the main analysis is 1,306. All the fiscal values have been adjusted to 
the 2011 real dollars.
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Population size and growth rate. Community population size and growth rate can 
determine the amount of public services demanded by residents and the economies of scale 
in public service provisions. A large and increasing community population creates pressure 
on government’s expenditures. However, the government may save cost per unit when 
providing public services to a larger size population. Therefore, the effects of population 
size and growth rate on government fiscal slack are indeterminate. 
Unemployment rate. This study uses the unemployment rate as an indicator of local 
economic conditions. Governments with a higher unemployment rate should save more 
fiscal slack to cope with potential economic and fiscal crises. However, the government 
may be fiscally incapable of saving much because it is difficult to collect sufficient 
revenues when economic conditions are deteriorating and the unemployment rate is high. 
Therefore, the relation of unemployment rate to government fiscal slack is ambiguous. 
Assessed value of properties. The assessed value of properties reflects the amount 
of accumulated wealth in a community and serves as the base of local property tax revenues. 
In communities with a higher value of properties, the capacity of government in coping 
with potential fiscal crises is stronger. Therefore, the government can save less fiscal slack 
and invest fiscal resources for economic development. There is a predicted negative 
correlation between the assessed value of properties with the fiscal slack. 
State aid. Municipalities that rely heavily on intergovernmental transfers are more 
vulnerable to external fiscal environment fluctuations, such as state aid reductions. 
Governments with a higher share of revenues from the state should save more to prepare 
for potential reductions. On the other hand, undue reliance on state aid may be a 
manifestation of weak fiscal capacity of local communities that do not have fiscal resources 
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to save. Therefore, the correlation between the dependence on state aid and government 
fiscal slack may be either positive or negative. 
Revenue diversity. Local government’s revenue structure (concentrated or 
diversified) can substantially affect its revenue volatility (Yan 2011). Governments with 
diversified revenue sources are less vulnerable to fluctuations of external fiscal 
environments. Therefore, it is less necessary to save fiscal slack to prepare for fiscal 
uncertainties. However, diversified revenue sources may result in continuous accumulation 
of fiscal surplus and lead to government amassing a large size of fiscal slack.23 
Free cash, excess tax capacity, and overlay reserve. Massachusetts municipalities 
maintain some alternative tools of fiscal reserves or informal forms of fiscal slack in 
budgetary operations. The free cash is the unrestricted funds from the previous fiscal year’s 
operating budget that are available for appropriation for the current fiscal year. 
Massachusetts’ Proposition 2½ sets a property tax levy limit for all municipalities.24 The 
excess property tax levy capacity is the difference between the property tax limit and the 
actual property tax levy. Another informal form of fiscal slack is the overlay reserve, which 
is an account used to fund the potential property tax abatements, exemptions and 
uncollected taxes in a certain fiscal year. All these fiscal resources can be utilized by the 
government to hedge against unforeseen revenue shortfalls and cope with sharp fiscal 
23 Revenue diversity is measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) by the formula as follows 
(Suyderhoud 1994): 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 =
1−(∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡)
𝑛
𝑗=1
2
1−
1
𝑛
, 
where i indicates the individual municipality, 𝑡 refers to time, and 𝑋𝑗  specifies the proportion of revenue j
out of 𝑛 revenue resources. HHI ranges between 0 and 1 with a higher value indicating a more diversified 
revenue structure. 
24 The property tax limit is calculated by “(1) adding an automatic increase of 2½ percent to the previous 
year’s levy limit and (2) adding an allowance for growth in service demands by multiplying the value of new 
construction by the prior year’s tax rate.” (Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton 2015: 308). 
100 
fluctuations or crises. This research uses the per capita free cash, excess tax capacity, and 
overlay reserve as measures of informal fiscal slack, which may substitute or complement 
stabilization funds. The sign of the correlation between these informal forms of fiscal slack 
and the stabilization funds depends on the substitutional or complementary effect. 
Outstanding debt. A government holding more outstanding debt has heavier fiscal 
obligations in interest and principal payment. To prevent debt default, government with a 
higher level of outstanding debt should save more fiscal slack. On the other hand, it is fairly 
possible that government borrows due to fiscal difficulties; therefore, it does not have fiscal 
resources to save. The correlation between government’s outstanding debt and fiscal slack 
is indeterminate. 
Government credit rating. Credit rating is an important indicator of government’s 
overall fiscal conditions. It represents a comprehensive evaluation of the default risk of 
governmental debt. A higher credit rating makes it easier for government to get access to 
the financial market in fiscal emergencies, and it helps to reduce the borrowing cost. In this 
vein, a higher credit rating reduces the importance of fiscal slack because it leaves 
government more fiscal space to raise funding amid fiscal difficulties. On the other hand, 
a higher credit rating implies healthier fiscal conditions and more stable revenues. Thus, 
the correlation between government credit rating and fiscal slack size can be either positive 
or negative. 
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4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Direct Effect of the Variables of Interest 
This research first regresses equation (3) using the municipality and year fixed 
effects with neither the municipal structure political-administrative index nor the 
interaction items, which echoes the practice of most previous studies. This research takes 
the natural logarithm of per capita stabilization fund balances as the dependent variable, 
and the results are reported in model 1 of table 3.3. The effects of voters’ pro-spending and 
anti-tax sentiment and government’s budgetary performance are consistent with hypothesis 
1 and 2, and these results echo the findings of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015). 
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Table 3.3 Empirical results 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables of interest 
Municipal structure index -0.174 -0.497 
(0.313) (0.332) 
Pro-spending sentiment -0.00232*** -0.00233* -0.00253** 
(0.000724) (0.00131) (0.00129) 
Anti-tax sentiment -0.0223*** 0.00341 0.00223 
(0.00669) (0.0110) (0.0111) 
Budgetary gap 0.000640*** 0.000716*** 0.000848*** 
(0.000132) (0.000243) (0.000254) 
Interaction terms 
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment 0.000610 
(0.00167) 
Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment 0.00529** 
(0.00264) 
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap -0.000383* 
(0.000230) 
Control variables 
Population size (log) -0.584 -1.719** -1.616** 
(0.407) (0.744) (0.727) 
Population growth rate (%) 0.0126* 0.0252* 0.0259* 
(0.00726) (0.0136) (0.0138) 
Unemployment rate (%) 0.00811 -0.0823 -0.0848 
(0.0270) (0.0738) (0.0732) 
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log) -0.880*** -1.678*** -1.508*** 
(0.200) (0.403) (0.399) 
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%) -0.00911 -0.0547*** -0.0499** 
(0.0106) (0.0211) (0.0210) 
Revenue diversity (HHI) 0.794 2.192* 2.268* 
(0.503) (1.199) (1.182) 
Free cash (per capita) 0.00267*** 0.00192*** 0.00198*** 
(0.000305) (0.000614) (0.000612) 
Excess tax capacity (per capita) 0.000380 -0.000317 -0.000249 
(0.000367) (0.000655) (0.000642) 
Overlay reserve (per capita) 0.00882*** 0.00872* 0.00954** 
(0.00214) (0.00468) (0.00453) 
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%) -0.000556 0.00138 0.00155 
(0.000691) (0.00154) (0.00152) 
Government creditworthiness 0.248*** 0.104 0.0739 
(0.0698) (0.136) (0.134) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
Constant 16.49*** 36.87*** 33.93*** 
(4.622) (10.02) (9.862) 
Observations 4,177 1,306 1,306 
R-squared 0.653 0.715 0.717 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The results from regressing equation (3) using the municipality and year fixed 
effects with the municipal structure index but not the interaction items are reported in 
model 2 of table 3.3. The effect of the municipal structure index is not statistically 
significant, implying that the political or administrative nature of municipal structure does 
not directly exert influence on government fiscal slack. The pro-spending sentiment of 
voters is negatively and statistically significantly related to government fiscal slack. Based 
on the descriptive statistics presented in table 3.2 and the magnitude of effect, one standard 
deviation increase in the measure of the pro-spending sentiment in a municipality makes 
the per capita budget stabilization fund balances decline by over six percent, holding other 
factors constant. The results support hypothesis 1. The results in model 2 also show that 
the effect of budgetary gap is positive and statistically significant. This finding supports 
hypothesis 2, implying that the government with an operating budget above the long-term 
expected trend level is likely to save more fiscal slack. One standard deviation increase in 
the per capita budgetary gap leads approximately to a 33 percent increase of the per capita 
stabilization fund balances, holding other factors constant. The anti-tax sentiment is not 
statistically significantly related to the dependent variable. 
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4.5.2 Interactive Effect of the Variables of Interest 
The last model of table 3.3 reports the results from regressing equation (4) using 
the municipality and year fixed effects with the municipal structure index and the 
interaction items. In the multiplicative interaction regression model, the effects of voters’ 
pro-spending and anti-tax sentiment and government’s budgetary gap on government fiscal 
slack size are conditional on the municipal structure index. Therefore, interpreting the 
coefficients as unconditional or average effects is problematic (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
2005). 
The budgetary gap is still positively and statistically significantly related to the 
dependent variable in model 3 with a magnitude of the effect close to those in model 1 and 
2. Meanwhile, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and
budgetary gap is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the positive effect of 
budgetary gap is modified and weakened by government internal management. As the 
nature of government internal management becomes more administrative or professional, 
the positive effect of budgetary gap becomes weaker. The results are consistent with 
hypothesis 3. A possible explanation is that the more administrative or professional 
government internal management may invest the fiscal slack resources for long-run 
economic development, to fund capital projects, or to achieve certain policy goals in times 
with vigorous budgetary performance, instead of saving the fiscal resources, due to the 
potential opportunity cost it brings about. 
Figure 3.2 shows the predicted marginal effect of the budgetary gap on stabilization 
fund balances of Massachusetts municipalities conditional on the municipal structure index 
with 95% confidence intervals. The vertical axis indicates the predicted marginal effect of 
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the budgetary gap, holding other variables at means, and the horizontal axis denotes the 
municipal structure political-professional index at an interval of 0.2. Figure 3.2 shows that 
the predicted marginal effect of the budgetary gap is always positive. However, the positive 
predicted marginal effect decreases as the nature of government internal management 
become more administrative or professional. The predicted marginal effect of the 
budgetary gap is statistically significant because the upper and lower bounds of the 
confidence intervals are always above the zero line (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005). 
Figure 3.2 Average marginal effects of budgetary gap on stabilization fund balances 
conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs 
Results in model 3 of table 3.3 also show that the effect of voters’ pro-spending 
sentiment is negative and statistically significant, and the magnitude of the effect is close 
to those in model 1 and 2. However, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal 
structure index and pro-spending sentiment is positive but not statistically significant. 
Figure 3.3 shows the predicted marginal effect of the pro-spending sentiment of voters is 
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always negative. As the nature of government internal management become more 
administrative or professional, the magnitude of the negative predicted marginal effect 
decreases. This finding implies that the negative effect of voters’ pro-spending sentiment 
on government fiscal slack size is modified or weakened by government internal 
management. Based on the confidence interval lines, the conditional effect of pro-spending 
sentiment is statistically significant when the municipal structure index ranges between 
around -0.6 and 0.4, which suggests the more administrative municipal structure. 
Figure 3.3 Average marginal effects of voters’ pro-spending sentiment on stabilization 
fund balances conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs 
Lastly, the effect of anti-tax sentiment of voters is not statistically significant. 
However, the effect of the interaction item between the municipal structure index and anti-
tax sentiment is positive and statistically significant. Figure 3.4 shows that although 
government internal management modifies or weakens the negative predicted marginal 
effect of the anti-tax sentiment on government fiscal slack size, the effect is not statistically 
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significant because the zero line traverses the area between the upper and lower bounds of 
the confidence intervals. 
Figure 3.4 Average marginal effects of voters’ anti-tax sentiment on stabilization fund 
balances conditional on municipal structure index with 95% CIs 
4.5.3 Robustness Checks 
Massachusetts municipalities maintain the stabilization funds as their formal fiscal 
slack. However, as aforementioned, there are other forms of fiscal resources that play 
similar roles with government fiscal slack. Employing a broader definition, government 
fiscal slack can be any fiscal resources reserved in various governmental funds that are 
used to make up for unexpected revenue shortfalls and prepare for potential fiscal 
difficulties in the future (Wei and Denison 2019). In this vein, the excess tax capacity, free 
cash, and overlay reserve can be deemed as informal fiscal slack of government, although 
they have different purposes, features and functions. Previous studies have investigated the 
relation between different forms of government fiscal slack in the U.S. states, and most 
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find that the substitution effect is trivial (Hou and Brewer 2010; Knight and Levinson 1999). 
The results in table 3.3 show that two informal forms of fiscal slack, the free cash and 
overlay reserve, are positively and statistically significantly related to the stabilization fund 
balances in Massachusetts municipalities. 
As a robustness check, this study uses the natural logarithm of per capita total of 
the stabilization funds, excess tax capacity, free cash and overlay reserve as an alternative 
measure of government fiscal slack. The results from regressing the same estimation 
models are reported in table 3.4. The statistical significance of the effects of variables of 
interest remain similar, but the magnitudes of effects is different on the grounds that the 
measure of fiscal slack has changed. 
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Table 3.4 Robustness check using an alternative measure of fiscal slack 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables of interest 
Municipal structure index 0.0431 0.191** 
(0.0639) (0.0958) 
Pro-spending sentiment -0.00216*** -0.00250*** -0.00247*** 
(0.000301) (0.000613) (0.000686) 
Anti-tax sentiment -0.00665** 0.00492 0.00531 
(0.00272) (0.00438) (0.00436) 
Budgetary gap 0.000341*** 0.000337*** 0.000259** 
(4.55e-05) (9.11e-05) (0.000103) 
Interaction terms 
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment 1.81e-05 
(0.00114) 
Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment -0.00240** 
(0.00114) 
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap -0.000211* 
(0.000109) 
Control variables 
Population size (log) -0.834*** -1.473*** -1.511*** 
(0.187) (0.341) (0.343) 
Population growth rate (%) 0.00716** 0.0107** 0.0105** 
(0.00335) (0.00498) (0.00487) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.00520 -0.0371* -0.0357 
(0.00856) (0.0219) (0.0218) 
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log) -0.408*** -0.281* -0.358** 
(0.0913) (0.165) (0.158) 
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%) -0.00265 -0.0126 -0.0145* 
(0.00467) (0.00824) (0.00815) 
Revenue diversity (HHI) 1.172*** 1.080** 1.034** 
(0.234) (0.463) (0.468) 
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%) -0.000496 0.000700 0.000609 
(0.000334) (0.000644) (0.000649) 
Government creditworthiness 0.224*** 0.162*** 0.173*** 
(0.0342) (0.0573) (0.0569) 
Constant 15.59*** 20.99*** 22.23*** 
(2.267) (4.575) (4.489) 
Observations 4,231 1,286 1,286 
R-squared 0.679 0.753 0.756 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.4 (continued) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Another robustness check regards the measure of the pro-spending sentiment of 
voters. As previously mentioned, this research adjusts the method of Snow, Gianakis, and 
Haughton (2015) to measure the pro-spending sentiment of voters. As a robustness check, 
this research then firmly follows the practice of Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) to 
use a binary measure, with 1 indicating the occurrence of a successful property tax limit 
override in a certain municipality and 0 otherwise. The occurrence of successful overrides 
suggests stronger pro-spending sentiment of voters. The results from regressing the same 
models with the previous robustness check by substituting the measure of voters’ pro-
spending sentiment are reported in table 3.5. The results in table 3.4 and 3.5 are similar in 
both the statistical significance and magnitudes of effects of the variables. 
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Table 3.5 Robustness check using an alternative measure of pro-spending sentiment 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables of interest 
Municipal structure index 0.0407 0.188** 
(0.0636) (0.0954) 
Pro-spending sentiment (occurrence) -0.225*** -0.236*** -0.242*** 
(0.0288) (0.0554) (0.0606) 
Anti-tax sentiment -0.00691** 0.00485 0.00526 
(0.00271) (0.00438) (0.00436) 
Budgetary gap 0.000335*** 0.000336*** 0.000259** 
(4.55e-05) (9.11e-05) (0.000103) 
Interaction terms 
Municipal structure index × Pro-spending sentiment 0.0215 
(0.103) 
Municipal structure index × Anti-tax sentiment -0.00242** 
(0.00114) 
Municipal structure index × Budgetary gap -0.000210* 
(0.000108) 
Control variables 
Population size (log) -0.837*** -1.472*** -1.509*** 
(0.187) (0.340) (0.341) 
Population growth rate (%) 0.00743** 0.0109** 0.0106** 
(0.00337) (0.00499) (0.00489) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.00435 -0.0378* -0.0364* 
(0.00839) (0.0220) (0.0219) 
Total assessed value of properties (per capita, log) -0.405*** -0.286* -0.364** 
(0.0912) (0.165) (0.158) 
State aid as percentage of total revenues (%) -0.00240 -0.0126 -0.0145* 
(0.00467) (0.00821) (0.00812) 
Revenue diversity (HHI) 1.192*** 1.076** 1.031** 
(0.233) (0.463) (0.468) 
Outstanding debt as percentage of budget (%) -0.000497 0.000694 0.000601 
(0.000333) (0.000643) (0.000650) 
Government creditworthiness 0.226*** 0.161*** 0.173*** 
(0.0342) (0.0573) (0.0569) 
Constant 15.57*** 21.05*** 22.30*** 
(2.266) (4.565) (4.478) 
Observations 4,231 1,286 1,286 
R-squared 0.680 0.753 0.756 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
Saving fiscal slack in economic booms to prepare for fiscal crises in the future is a 
prevailing strategy adopted by the U.S. state and local governments. Fiscal slack of local 
government is a more salient issue compared to the state due to the large size and informal 
forms. This research focuses on one of the most fundamental inquiries about local 
government fiscal slack, namely, the determinants of its size. This research constructs a 
three-dimensional framework to analyze local government fiscal slack, including the 
preferences of voters (anti-tax and pro-spending sentiment), government’s budgetary 
performance (budgetary gap), and government internal management (municipal structure 
index on the political-administrative dimension). The three dimensions work interactively 
to determine local government fiscal slack. This study uses Massachusetts municipalities 
as a research sample. The empirical findings show that the defined budgetary gap is 
positively and statistically significantly related to government’s fiscal slack balances, 
which is measured by either the level of stabilization funds or the sum of stabilization funds 
and other informal forms of fiscal slack resources. However, the municipal structure 
political-administrative index weakens the positive effect of the budgetary gap. The pro-
spending sentiment of voters has a negative effect on government fiscal slack, and the 
municipal structure index weakens the negative effect. 
Findings from this study have substantial implications for academics and 
government financial management practitioners. Fiscal resources shape “many of the 
113 
outcomes that matter to public administration, including the effectiveness of public service 
delivery networks, the decision to undertake management reforms, performance 
implications of managers’ networking activities, and nonprofits’ decisions to pursue 
‘entrepreneurial’ activities.” (Kioko et al. 2011). In-depth understanding of the 
determinants of government fiscal slack helps government officials wisely save and spend 
in the cyclical economic upturn and downturn times and maintain a long-term fiscal 
sustainability. 
Government fiscal slack is an important public management issue pertaining to 
budgetary transparency (Rose and Smith 2012; Stewart et al. 2015). Local government 
usually uses such informal fiscal slack as the year-end general fund balances (Guo and 
Wang 2017; Wang and Hou 2012). The informal form renders local government fiscal 
slack a nontransparent “grey area”. Scholars of economics and organizational science have 
investigated the misuse of fiscal slack and the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders of private sector organizations (Bebchuk and Fried 2003; Jensen 1986). 
Similar problems exist in the public sector. The lengthiness and complexity of government 
financial reports, such as the Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs), create 
difficulties for ordinary voters and the media to monitor the fiscal management of local 
government effectively and efficiently, thus forging opportunities for officials’ misuse of 
public fiscal resources and corruption actions (Benito and Bastida 2009; Stewart et al. 
2015). Moreover, the size of local government fiscal slack is generally larger compared to 
the state government. Credit rating agencies and professional organizations commonly 
recommend that government maintains 5-15 percent of their operating budget as fiscal 
reserves (Gore 2009). However, many local governments hold a much higher level of fiscal 
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slack (Marlowe 2005). Understanding the determinants of local government fiscal slack 
facilitates voters and the media to properly monitor and regulate the saving behavior of 
government and help government officials to enact and implement prudent fiscal slack 
policies. 
It is also helpful to discuss the potential limitation of this research in external 
generalizability. Considering the substantial variation in the measurement of local 
government fiscal slack and differences in institutional rules and external fiscal 
environments confronted by the local governments across states, this research focuses on 
municipalities from one single state. This is a common practice employed by scholars of 
many previous studies, such as Minnesota in Marlowe (2005), Florida in Guo and Wang 
(2017), North Carolina in Wang and Hou (2012), and Massachusetts in Gianakis and Snow 
(2007). As noted by Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015), “research that crosses state 
lines must cope with the lack of a common dependent variable, a problem that is not easily 
resolved.” Further studies that use similar research approaches but take research examples 
from other states are highly encouraged. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 Summary of statewide tax limitation ballot questions (1980-2010) 
Question 
number 
Year Summary of ballot questions 
Statewide 
fraction of “yes” 
Statewide 
fraction of “no” 
Enacted? 
1 1980 The proposed law would impose a limit on state and local taxes 
on real estate and personal property equal to 2.5% of the full 
and fair cash value of the property being taxed. 
59.00% 41.00% Yes 
3 1986 The proposed law would reduce and then repeal the 7.5% surtax 
on Massachusetts state income taxes and would limit state tax 
revenue growth to the level of growth in total wages and 
salaries of the citizens of the state. 
54.40% 45.60% Yes 
6 1994 This proposed constitutional amendment would require 
Massachusetts income tax rates to be graduated, in order to 
distribute the burden of the tax fairly and equitably. 
69.60% 30.40% Yes 
3 1998 This proposed law would change the state income tax rate on 
interest and dividend income, which was 12% as of September 
1997, to whatever rate applies to Part B taxable income (such as 
wages and salaries), which was 5.95% as of September 1997. 
The change would take effect starting in tax year 2000. 
81.90% 18.10% Yes 
4 2000 This proposed law would repeal the law setting the state 
personal income tax rate on Part B taxable income (such as 
wages and salaries), which was 5.95% as of September 1,1999 
and would set the rate at 5.6% for tax year 2001, 5.3% for tax 
year 2002, and 5% for tax year 2003 and after. If the 
Legislature set a lower rate for any of those years, that lower 
rate would apply. 
59.40% 40.60% Yes 
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1 2002 This proposed law would provide that no income or other gain 
realized on or after July 1, 2003, would be subject to the state 
personal income tax. 
45.30% 54.70% No 
1 2008 This proposed law would reduce the state personal income tax 
rate to 2.65% for all categories of taxable income for the tax 
year beginning on or after January 1, 2009, and would eliminate 
the tax for all tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2010.  
30.60% 69.40% No 
3 2010 This proposed law would reduce the state sales and use tax rates 
(which were 6.25% as of September 2009) to 3% as of January 
1, 2011. 
43.20% 56.80% No 
Notes: 
1. The fractions of “yes” and “no” are for statewide voting results. There are records for the corresponding voting results for each
Massachusetts municipality, which are utilized to calculate the anti-tax sentiment of voters in each municipality.
2. Information presented in this table is accessible from the website of Massachusetts Election Statistics at
http://electionstats.state.ma.us/ballot_questions/search/year_from:1972/year_to:2016.
3. Snow, Gianakis, and Haughton (2015) report similar information in their research. Refer to the table 1 in that article for details.
4. Question 6 in 1994 regards the distribution of tax burden. The proposed amendment would require tax rates be progressive as
the income increases. Therefore, this amendment has the equivalent consequence of increasing tax burdens of taxpayers with
higher incomes. “Yes” in this question means in favor of tax increase and “no” means supporting tax limitation. The percentages
of “yes” and “no” are switched to make them consistent with other questions.
117 
APPENDIX 2 Factor analysis of components of the principal factor 
Index components Principal factor Uniqueness 
Existence of a chief administrative officer 0.7727 0.4018 
Election method of the government head 0.5694 0.6348 
Independence of government head from council (board) 0.9395 0.115 
Authority of government head to veto council (board) 0.9257 0.1425 
Partisan or nonpartisan election of council (board) members 0.6669 0.5484 
At-large or by-district election of council (board) members 0.0552 0.9381 
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